State of Wyoming

Department of Health

Public Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan
Version 7.0

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Pandemic Influenza Response Plan

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pandemic influenza is considered to be a relatively high probability event, yet no one knows when the next pandemic will occur and there may be very little warning. Most experts believe that there will be one to six months between the identification of a novel influenza virus and the time widespread outbreaks begin to occur in the United States. Outbreaks are expected to occur simultaneously throughout the country, preventing relocation of human and material resources. The effect of influenza on individual communities will be relatively prolonged, an estimated six to eight weeks. Due to the prolonged nature of a pandemic influenza event, the World Health Organization (WHO) has defined phases to a pandemic in order to facilitate coordinated plans (Table 1). The Wyoming Department of Health (WDH) has developed its own pandemic phases for planning purposes (Table 2).

Table 1: WHO Pandemic Influenza Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-pandemic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic Alert</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Increased and sustained transmission in general population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The distinction between phase 1 and phase 2 is based on the risk of human infection or disease resulting from circulating strains in animals. The distinction is based on various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge. Factors may include pathogenicity in animals and humans, occurrence in domesticated animals and livestock or only in wildlife, whether the virus is enzootic or epizootic, geographically localized or widespread, and/or other scientific parameters.

b The distinction between phase 3, phase 4 and phase 5 is based on an assessment of the risk of a pandemic. Various factors and their relative importance according to current scientific knowledge may be considered. Factors may include rate of transmission, geographical location and spread, severity of illness, presence of genes from human strains (if derived from an animal strain), and/or other scientific parameters.
Table 2: Wyoming Pandemic Influenza Phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corresponding WHO Period</th>
<th>US Govt stages</th>
<th>WY Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-pandemic (1&amp;2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic Alert (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic Alert (4&amp;5) and Pandemic (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Human to human transmission occurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited transmission in other countries or US states (but not in WY) or widespread transmission in other countries. May include isolated sporadic cases in WY, without evidence of transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandemic (6)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Widespread transmission in US (but not in WY) and/or limited transmission in WY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Increased and sustained transmission in WY population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Deceleration</td>
<td>Rates of pandemic influenza infection are decreasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Pandemic influenza cases have ceased, or occur only sporadically</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. PURPOSE

The purpose of this plan is to provide guidance for the Wyoming Department of Health (WDH) for detecting and responding to an influenza pandemic. This plan must be periodically reviewed and updated to ensure that its assumptions, resources, priorities, and protocols are consistent with current knowledge and changing infrastructure. In addition, in the event of a pandemic, the judgments of the public health leadership, based on the epidemiology of the outbreak and the extent of population infection, may alter or override anticipated strategies and plans.

III. FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The federal government is responsible for nationwide coordination of the pandemic influenza response. Specific areas of responsibility include the following:

- Surveillance in the U.S. and globally
- Epidemiologic investigation in the U.S. and globally
- Development and use of diagnostic laboratory tests and reagents
- Development of reference strains and reagents for vaccines
- Vaccine evaluation and licensure
• Determination of populations at highest risk and strategies for vaccination and antiviral use
• Assessment of measures to decrease transmission (such as travel restrictions, isolation, and quarantine)
• Deployment of federally purchased vaccine
• Deployment of antiviral agents in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)
• Evaluation of the efficacy of response measures
• Evaluation of vaccine safety
• Deployment of the Commissioned Corps Readiness Force and Epidemic Intelligence Service officers
• Medical and public health communications

IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITIES

States are responsible for coordination of the pandemic influenza response within and between their jurisdictions. Specific areas of responsibility include the following:
• Identification of public and private sector partners needed for effective planning and response
• Development of key components of pandemic influenza preparedness plan (surveillance, vaccine and antiviral distribution, disease control, and communications) following guidance provided by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the national Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan
• Integration of pandemic influenza planning with other planning activities conducted under Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Public Health Preparedness and Response and Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) Hospital Preparedness Program cooperative agreements with states
• Coordination with local areas to ensure development of local plans as called for by the state plan and provide resources, such as templates to assist in planning process
• Development of data management systems needed to implement components of the plan
• Assistance to local areas in exercising plans
• Coordination with adjoining jurisdictions

V. ASSUMPTIONS

• A novel influenza virus strain will likely emerge in a country other than the United States, but a novel strain could emerge first in the U.S.
• The pandemic may occur during time periods not normally associated with the usual influenza season, and the pandemic strain may attack categories of people at different rates than that which normally occurs during the influenza season
• There may be as little as one to six months warning before outbreaks begin in the U.S., if the pandemic emerges outside this country
• Although there may be isolated pockets, the pandemic could affect all areas of the state
• When the pandemic occurs, vaccines and antiviral medicines will be in short supply and will have to be allocated on a priority basis
• It will take six to eight months after the novel virus is identified before the vaccine is available for distribution, unless a DNA vaccine is developed and deemed safe and necessary
• A second dose of vaccine (two to four weeks after the first) may be required to develop immunity to the novel virus
• In a pandemic, vaccine purchase and distribution options include:
  o public sector purchase and distribution of all pandemic influenza vaccine
  o a mixed public-private system where public sector supply may be targeted to specific priority groups (e.g., health care workers and those providing essential public safety services) and those who may be underserved by the current system
  o maintenance of the current, largely private, system
• The federal government has assumed responsibility for devising a liability program for vaccine manufacturers and persons administering the vaccine
• Secondary bacterial infections following influenza illness may stress antibiotic supplies.
• Response to the demand for services may require non-standard approaches, including:
  o Discharge of all but critically ill hospital patients
  o Expansion of hospital capacity by using all available space and less than code beds
  o Increase of patient ratio to hospital staff
  o Recruitment of volunteers who can provide custodial services under the general supervision of health and medical workers
  o Relaxation of practitioner licensure requirements as deemed appropriate, and
  o Utilization of general purpose and special needs shelters as temporary health facilities
• Educating the public about the rationale for priority groups for antivirals and vaccine will be an important aspect of public education
• There will be widespread circulation of conflicting information, misinformation, and rumors. Communication must be coordinated among all relevant agencies to ensure consistent messages to the general public.

VI. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

A. Command Structure

The WDH Director (or his/her designee) is responsible for officially activating the Wyoming Pandemic Influenza Response Plan during an influenza pandemic. The WDH Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) describes the WDH National Incident Management System Incident Command System structure that will be implemented in the event of a public health emergency, including an influenza pandemic. In addition, the EOP outlines the procedures for activating and operating the WDH Epidemiology Response Center (ERC). The WDH Director will decide when to activate this command system and/or the WDH IRC based on current information and recommendations from the State Health Officer (SHO) and the State Epidemiologist (SE).

1. Pandemic Influenza Working Group
    WDH has designated a working group to oversee planning, response and mitigation efforts and ensure that this plan is developed, reviewed, and periodically revised. By identifying critical issues, this group will develop this response plan and other materials related to a pandemic influenza response. During a pandemic response, this group will be responsible for developing recommendations and guidelines, particularly for the use of limited vaccine and antiviral supplies. The Working Group may need to be expanded to include other subject matter experts as a pandemic situation develops. Current group members are listed in Appendix A.

2. Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee
    WDH has designated an Advisory Committee consisting of stakeholders and representatives from WDH and partnering state agencies. A list of committee members is included in Appendix A.

B. Powers of the State Health Officer

1. Quarantine and Isolation
    The WDH, through the SHO, or under his/her direction and supervision, has the power to establish, maintain and enforce isolation and quarantine, and in pursuance thereof, and for
such purpose only, to exercise such physical control over property and over the persons of the people within this state as necessary for the protection of the public health (W.S. 35-1-240). Any person who has been quarantined may appeal to the district court at any time for release from the quarantine (W.S. 35-4-112).

2. Closing of Public Buildings and Events
   The SHO has the authority to close theaters, schools and other public places, and to forbid gatherings of people when necessary to protect the public health (W.S. 35-1-240).

3. Mandatory Vaccination
   In most cases, the SHO does not have the authority to subject any person to any vaccination or medical treatment without the consent of that person (W.S. 35-4-113). However, during a public health emergency, the SHO may subject a person to vaccination or medical treatment without consent in the following circumstances:
   - If the parent, legal guardian or other adult person authorized to consent to medical treatment of a minor child cannot be located and consulted and the vaccination of or medical treatment for the minor child is reasonably needed to protect the public health or protect the minor child from disease, death, disability or suffering;
   - If the person authorized to consent on behalf of an incompetent person cannot be located and consulted and the vaccination of or medical treatment for the incompetent person is reasonably needed to protect the public health or protect the incompetent person from disease, death, disability or suffering.
   - If a person withholds or refuses consent for himself, a minor or other incompetent when the vaccination or medical treatment is reasonably needed to protect the health of others from a disease carrying the risk of death or disability, then the person for whom the vaccination or medical treatment is refused may be quarantined by the SHO.

4. Liability
   During a public health emergency any healthcare provider or other person who in good faith follows the instructions of the SHO is immune from any liability arising from complying with those instructions (W.S. 35-4-114). This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.
5. Fatality Management

Procedures and systems for collecting, processing, and disposition of the dead, including retrieval of bodies from homes and procedures and systems for storage of bodies are local government responsibilities. The WDH Vital Statistics Services issues death certificates once appropriate paperwork is filed by local officials. The State of Wyoming Board of Embalming, on which the WDH Director serves, has established rules and regulations detailing the requirements for disposition of the dead.

The WDH through the SHO is given the statutory “power and duty … To regulate the disposal, transportation, interment, and disinterment of the dead.” [35-1-240 (a)(viii)]. In addition, WY Statute 35-1-241 details powers of the SHO during a public health emergency regarding the dead:

Wyoming State statute 35-1-241: Safe disposal of corpses in emergency circumstances:

(a) The state health officer in consultation with the appropriate county coroner, during the period that a public health emergency exists, may:

(i) Adopt and enforce measures to provide for the safe disposal of corpses as may be reasonable and necessary for emergency response. These measures may include the embalming, burial, cremation, interment, disinterment, transportation and disposal of corpses;

(ii) Take possession or control of any corpse;

(iii) Order the disposal of any corpse of a person who has died of an infectious disease through burial or cremation within twenty-four (24) hours after death;

(iv) Compel any person authorized to embalm, bury, cremate, inter, disinter, transport or dispose of corpses to accept any corpse or provide the use of his business or facility if the actions are reasonable and necessary for emergency response. The use of a business or facility may include transferring the management and supervision of the business or facility to the state health officer and granting the right for the state health officer to take immediate possession for a limited or unlimited period of time, but shall not exceed beyond the termination of the public health emergency.

(b) Every corpse prior to disposal pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be clearly labeled with all available information to identify the decedent and the circumstances of death. Any corpse of a deceased person with an infectious disease shall have an external, clearly visible tag indicating that the corpse is infected and, if known, the infectious disease.

(c) Every person in charge of disposing of any corpse pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall maintain a written record of each corpse and all available information to identify the decedent and the circumstances of death and disposal. If a corpse cannot be identified, prior to disposal a qualified person shall, to the extent possible, take fingerprints and one (1) or more photographs of the corpse, and collect a DNA specimen. All information collected under this subsection shall be promptly forwarded to the state health official.

While WDH, the SHO, and the State of Wyoming do have some statutory authority regarding handling and disposition of the dead, the State and WDH do not have resources, systems, or personnel dedicated to
collecting, processing, and final disposition of the dead. In a public health emergency such as an influenza pandemic the WDH will work with local government officials, including the County Coroner, as needed to help facilitate the safe disposition of dead bodies to protect the public’s health. This may involve coordinating with officials from the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security (WOHS) and federal officials to acquire assistance through aid agreements.

However, it is anticipated that resources from other jurisdictions (jurisdictions within the state or from other states) will be unavailable during a widespread public health emergency like an influenza pandemic. Therefore, it is critical that each local government have plans in place to address the almost certain need for additional collection, processing, storage, and final disposition of the dead during a pandemic.

One of the mitigation strategies the WDH will likely employ during a pandemic is to discourage large public gatherings. This advice would apply to large gatherings at memorial services or funerals. However, WDH does not have intentions of preventing family members from attending a small memorial service or funeral for loved ones, although it is possible public health officials would take such action if the situation suggested it was necessary to protect public health.

WDH will offer guidance to healthcare facilities, morgue/mortuary staff, and the public on ways to safely handle the bodies of those deceased from pandemic influenza (see Appendix O).

C. Activities by Wyoming Pandemic Phase

1. **Wyoming Pandemic Phases 1 and 2** (WHO Inter-pandemic and early Pandemic Alert Periods)
   a. WDH has established a Pandemic Influenza Working Group and an Advisory Committee.
   b. WDH has developed this response plan as an annex to the department's existing EOP. This plan will be reviewed and modified at least annually (more often if deemed necessary).
   c. WDH Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program (PHEP) is continually working to develop and maintain lists of partners, resources, and facilities to be utilized during a public health emergency.
   d. WDH will continue to coordinate planning activities with bordering jurisdictions, including counties, states, and unique populations (such as American Indian nations and Military Installations). Additionally, WDH advises local health departments to contact and coordinate their activities with international airports, F.E. Warren Air Force Base, and the tribes on the Wind River Indian Reservation.
c. WDH is working with local public health and emergency management agencies to assist with the development of local pandemic plans. WDH has developed and distributed two documents to assist counties in their planning process: Pandemic Influenza Planning Roles (Appendix B) and Pandemic Planning Guidance for Local Public Health and Emergency Management Agencies (Appendix C).

f. WDH has provided a canned tabletop exercise for counties to use to exercise their local pandemic response plans (Materials available upon request).

2. **Wyoming Pandemic Phase 3** (Pandemic Alert and early Pandemic Period)
   a. Convene the Working Group, the Advisory Committee, and other partners and stakeholders to review plan.
   b. Notify local jurisdictions and encourage them to review their pandemic response plans and current capabilities.
   c. Coordinate with other states and federal agencies and bordering jurisdictions.

3. **Wyoming Pandemic Phases 4 and 5**; WHO Pandemic Period
   a. Meet with partners and stakeholders as appropriate to review and update the plan.
   b. Notify key government officials and legislators of the need for additional monetary resources and other additional resources as needed.
   c. Coordinate with other states, federal agencies, and bordering jurisdictions.
   d. Monitor staffing and other agency resource needs.
   e. Document expenses related to the pandemic response.

**VII. SURVEILLANCE**

A. **Existing Surveillance System**

1. Passive Surveillance of Confirmed Cases
   Laboratory confirmed influenza and influenza-associated deaths are reportable to WDH in the State of Wyoming. Reports are received from physicians, hospitals, and laboratories. Both rapid test and culture positives are reported through this system.

2. Influenza-Like Illness Sentinel Reporting System
   Wyoming currently enrolls about 30 healthcare providers participating in the U.S. Influenza Sentinel Surveillance Project coordinated by the CDC. This system consists of two components:
a. Influenza-Like Illness Reporting: The sentinel sites report influenza-like illness (ILI) morbidity data directly to the CDC via internet or fax on a weekly basis starting in early October. Sentinels are asked to continue to report ILI throughout the year. The weekly transmission includes the number of patients seen for ILI during the week in four age categories (0-4 years, 5-24 years, 25-64 years and 65+ years) and the total number of patients seen for any reason during the week.

b. Submission of Laboratory Samples: The sentinel sites are asked to submit nasal, nasopharyngeal, and/or throat swab specimens from a sample of their patients presenting with ILI to the Wyoming Public Health Laboratory (WPHL) for influenza testing and typing. Both positive and negative results are reported to the WDH Infectious Disease Epidemiology Program (ID Epi). ID Epi reports results to the submitting sentinel provider.

3. Pediatric Deaths
ID Epi investigates all reports of deaths in patients < 18 years old with evidence of influenza virus infection using CDC-provided materials.

4. Current Laboratory Testing (Seasonal Influenza Surveillance)
   a. The WPHL currently provides specimen collection kits and protocols to each of the sentinel providers to ensure the safe, proper collection and transport of influenza specimens during the influenza season (October – March). These collections kits are prepackaged and shipped to the sentinel sites at the beginning of the influenza season, and are continually re-supplied to the sentinel provider as they submit specimens through the season. Also provided within each kit is a pre-addressed Federal Express (Fed Ex) label which allows the sentinel site to ship the specimens “postage paid” to the WPHL. All shipments must comply with current DOT/IATA shipping regulations.
   b. In addition to seasonal influenza surveillance, any primary care physician that suspects avian flu or has presumptively identified a suspect cluster of influenza-like illness (ILI), may make a request through ID Epi to submit influenza specimens throughout the year. If sufficient justification exists, ID Epi will contact the WPHL and collection kits will be sent to the provider for controlled collection and shipment of specimens to the laboratory for testing.
   c. Currently, specimens are received, accessioned, and screened by rRT-PCR for Types A and B, and subtypes H1 and H3. Those positive for Type A will be subsequently be inoculated onto cell culture, incubated for 2-3 days, and if cytopathic effect is evident, a DFA (Direct fluorescent antibody test by microscopy) is performed to determine if the virus is influenza
Type A or Type B. Cell culture is the laboratory method necessary to isolate viable virus to both confirm live virus in the clinical sample and to provide further strain characterization. If the specimen is negative, no further workup is necessary. If the specimen is type B, WPHL reports the results to ID Epi and conducts no further testing. If the specimen is Type A, an IFA (Indirect fluorescent antibody test by microscopy) will be performed using WHO reagents to determine if the virus is H1 or H3, the current circulating strains. All unusual subtypes by rRT-PCR will be reported to CDC via the Emergency Response Hotline (770-488-7100).

d. Laboratory biosafety procedures

i. Laboratory staff involved in accessioning, processing, and analysis of potential influenza virus samples will be monitored for presentation of ILI during the period of the influenza season when positive samples are being submitted. All laboratory staff in the microbiology section are offered the current vaccine.

ii. Laboratory staff involved in cell culture and molecular analysis will insure that enhanced biosafety level 2 procedures are followed for all sample processing including manipulation of samples with potential live virus in a BSC, use of gloves, lab coats and masks (when appropriate), processing of samples with no other staff in the immediate lab area and disinfection of the processing area following each procedure.

e. Currently the influenza laboratory staff includes the molecular virologist/WNV microbiologist and two laboratory scientists assigned part-time duties for cell culture processing, analysis and fluorescent microscopy confirmation. In advanced phases, if the workload volume increases beyond the current staffing capacity, the bioterrorism preparedness laboratory staff will serve as a surge capacity laboratory for additional manpower.

5. Deaths from Influenza and Pneumonia

The Vital Statistics Services of the WDH reports the total number of deaths processed each week as well as the number of those deaths attributable to pneumonia and influenza to ID Epi.


The WDH State Public Health Veterinarian participates in an interagency committee that includes the Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory (WSVL), Wyoming Department of Game and Fish (WG&F), US Fish and Wildlife Services (USFWS), the Wyoming State Veterinarian, and others. This committee is involved with the surveillance of avian influenza, among other veterinary diseases.
of public health importance. The WDH State Public Health Veterinarian is in constant communication with the above groups to link and share animal and human disease surveillance systems.

7. Novel Influenza Case Definition.

This case definition is for surveillance purposes only and is NOT meant to guide clinical decision making. It will be most useful during the very early stages of a pandemic. In later stages the case definition may be different based on the availability of confirmatory testing at the WPHL and the widespread nature of the disease.

Clinical Presentation

An Illness compatible with influenza virus infection.

Laboratory Evidence

A human case of infection with an influenza A virus subtype that is different from currently circulating human influenza H1 and H3 viruses. Novel subtypes include, but are not limited to, H2, H5, H7, and H9 subtypes. Influenza H1 and H3 subtypes originating from a non-human species or from genetic reassortment between animal and human viruses are also novel subtypes. Novel subtypes will be detected with methods available for detection of currently circulating human influenza viruses at state public health laboratories (e.g., real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction [RT-PCR]). Non-human influenza viruses include avian subtypes (e.g., H5, H7, or H9 viruses), swine and other mammalian subtypes. Confirmation that an influenza A virus represents a novel virus will be performed by CDC’s influenza laboratory.

Criteria for epidemiologic linkage: a) the patient has had contact with one or more persons who either have or had the disease and b) transmission of the agent by the usual modes of transmission is plausible. A case may be considered epidemiologically linked to a laboratory-confirmed case if at least one case in the chain of transmission is laboratory confirmed.
Case Classification

Confirmed: A case of human infection with a novel influenza A virus confirmed at the WPHL or at the CDC.

Probable: A case meeting the clinical criteria and epidemiologically linked to a confirmed case, but for which no laboratory testing for influenza virus infection has been performed.

Suspected: A case meeting the clinical criteria, pending laboratory confirmation. Any case of human infection with an influenza A virus that is different from currently circulating human influenza H1 and H3 viruses is classified as a suspected case until the confirmation process is complete.

B. Activities by Wyoming Pandemic Phase

1. Wyoming Phase 1 (WHO Inter-pandemic Period)

   In the preparation for an influenza pandemic, routine surveillance systems should be expanded where feasible. Activities to be considered include:

   a. Maintain the routine sentinel physician network and attempt to expand to at least one physician or clinic for each county.

   b. WPHL has implemented Real-Time Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (rRT-PCR) for preliminary detection of influenza virus strains in clinical specimens. rRT-PCR is performed on the original patient specimen. Turn around time can be within 24 hours as compared to a number of days for the culture method. rRT-PCR can identify the virus type as either type A or B, and subtype as H1, H3, the currently circulating subtypes, and H5 the avian strain.

   c. Institute an aberration detection system (syndromic surveillance) that monitors daily patient load at selected urgent care facilities to detect variation in emergency outpatient visits that would then be investigated to determine a cause, which could be influenza. The Infectious Disease Epidemiology Program has implemented a syndromic surveillance system in eight Wyoming hospitals and reviews data from ED admissions.

   d. Emphasize reporting of outbreaks in nursing homes and other institutional settings and provide epidemiologic support for investigation activities, including laboratory support to identify causes.
2. **Wyoming Phase 2** (WHO Pandemic Alert Period)

   Human infection with novel virus identified, but no sustained human-to-human transmission.
   
   a. Monitor CDC weekly influenza updates regarding clinical, epidemiological, and virologic characteristics of the novel strain.
   
   b. Provide updates to public and private healthcare providers, including, but not limited to county health officers, public health nurses, infection control practitioners, sentinel providers, hospitals, clinics, and private physician offices, through the ID Epi website, Epidemiology Alerts, Epidemiology Bulletins, and telephone and video conferences as needed.
   
   c. WPHL will obtain reagents from CDC to detect and identify the novel strain, when available.
   
   d. Request that sentinel providers collect specimens from patients presenting with ILI, especially those with a recent travel history to a region where the novel strain is circulating or persons with unusual/severe symptoms.
   
   e. Other providers will be informed that any testing for novel influenza will be conducted only following consultation with ID Epi staff due to the limited capacity of the WPHL. If WDH and the provider agree that testing for the novel strain is indicated, ID Epi will coordinate the proper submission of specimens to the WPHL.
   
   f. WDH will request that all providers collect specimens from patients meeting the following criteria:

      i. Hospitalized patients with severe ILI, including pneumonia, who meet the epidemiologic criteria for exposure risk (see iii), or
      
      ii. Non-hospitalized patients with ILI and with strong epidemiologic suspicion of novel influenza virus exposure (see iii).

      iii. Epidemiologic criteria for risk exposure:

         a. Persons who recently visited or lived in an area affected by highly pathogenic novel influenza A outbreaks in animals (e.g. domestic poultry) or where a human case of novel influenza has been confirmed, and either
            
            i. had direct contact with affected animals, or
            
            ii. had close contact with a person with confirmed or suspected novel influenza.

         b. Persons at occupational risk for infection with a novel strain of influenza (e.g. persons who work on farms or live poultry markets or who process or handle poultry infected with known or suspected avian influenza viruses, workers in
laboratories that contain live animal or novel influenza viruses), and healthcare
workers in direct contact with a suspected or confirmed novel influenza case.

g. Laboratory algorithm: For cases with a strong epidemiologic suspicion of novel influenza
virus exposure, WPRL will screen samples using rRT-PCR. Cell culture will not be
performed until the rRT-PCR result for type A and type B and H1 and H3 typing is
completed and potential H5 samples are ruled out. Specimens that are type B will be
reported and no further workup is necessary. If a specimen is negative for type A and type
B, no further workup is necessary. Specimens that are positive for type A will be tested with
rRT-PCR for H1, H3 and H5. If negative for all three, specimen will be sent to the CDC
overnight for further subtyping. Specimens positive for H1, H3 or H5 will immediately be
reported to ID Epi via fax and phone. Those positive for H1 and H3 will subsequently be set
up on culture, while those positive for H5 will be sent to reference laboratory. A positive
RT-PCR test result for a novel influenza strains should be considered presumptive, pending
testing by a second reference laboratory. Any isolate may be sent to the CDC for further
strain identification. The laboratory will call the CDC Emergency Response Hotline (770-
488-7100) before sending specimens for influenza A reference testing. This number is
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hotline staff will notify a member of the Influenza
Branch who will contact the laboratory to answer questions and provide guidance.
Specimens should be sent by Priority Overnight Shipping for receipt within 24 hours.
Samples may be frozen at -70 if the package cannot be shipped within a specified time.
Include specimen inventory sheet, include the assigned CDC case ID number, and not
“Influenza surveillance” on all materials and specimens sent. All shipment must comply
with current DOT/IATA shipping regulations.

h. As usual, if at any phase of subtyping, WPRL tests indicate that an influenza virus isolate
may be a strain other than those currently circulating; the WPRL will immediately notify
CDC via the Emergency Response Hotline (770-488-7100) for assistance.
i. ID Epi will call the CDC Emergency Response Hotline (770-488-7100) to report a suspected
case of infection with a novel influenza virus.

j. ID Epi will conduct follow-up on all cases and complete a CDC case screening and report
form (Appendix D) and fax the completed form to CDC at 888-232-1322.
k. Develop surveillance system for severe respiratory illnesses through active surveillance of
infection control practitioners. Develop a reporting form to be completed daily by infection
control. **Activate this system if/when novel strain is identified in the US.**
3. **Wyoming Phase 3** (WHO Pandemic Alert and early Pandemic Periods)

Human-to-human transmission occurring; Limited transmission in other countries or US states (not WY); or widespread transmission in other countries. May include isolated sporadic cases in WY without evidence of transmission.

a. Expand the number of sentinel providers and possibly expand amount of testing each sentinel provider is conducting. Possibly expand testing to also include private clinics, hospitals, private practices, institutions, and other healthcare facilities, as for phase 4.

b. WPHL and ID Epi will coordinate to identify those facilities needing collection kits.

c. Continue to request that all providers submit specimens for those persons meeting the epidemiologic criteria described in 2.f.

d. ID Epi will strive to conduct individual follow-up and confirmation for all persons meeting the epidemiologic criteria described in 2.f, and all other persons who are laboratory confirmed positive for the novel strain.

e. ID Epi will continue to monitor the syndromic surveillance system.

f. Laboratory algorithm: Same as previous phase, with possible expansion to include all patients with healthcare provider clinical diagnosis of influenza.

g. ID Epi will assess functionality, timeliness, and completeness of reporting, data entry, and data dissemination, and will make improvements where warranted.

h. Assess the need to screen travelers arriving in the state from affected countries or states.

i. ID Epi will investigate outbreaks and increases in ILI, including those detected through the sentinel provider surveillance system.

j. CDC will advise states on the percentage of isolates per week or month that they should send to CDC as part of efforts to monitor changes in the antigenicity and antiviral susceptibility of the pandemic virus. Throughout the pandemic, CDC will provide updated instructions on the collection of clinical and epidemiologic data that should accompany isolates. CDC could ask some state public health laboratories to perform virus isolation or RT-PCR subtyping before sending specimens to CDC.

l. If prepandemic vaccine is available, conduct surveillance for adverse events from the vaccine using the CDC’s Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS).

m. Although Wyoming currently uses the NEDSS Base System (NBS) (as required by CDC) for disease reporting to the CDC, and would prefer to report individual early novel influenza cases to CDC using this system, recent communications with the influenza branch at CDC have indicated that the NBS will not be an option for case reporting to CDC. Instead, the CDC plans to require states to complete forms for case reporting and fax them to CDC,
and/or complete excel spreadsheets and email them daily to CDC. As such, ID Epi will await CDC’s distribution of case report forms and the appropriate fax number/email address. When those are available, ID Epi will complete the forms and fax them to CDC for each early case of novel flu. ID Epi will also report (presumably by fax) the state-wide attack rate, case fatality rate, number of isolated and quarantined persons, and number of novel flu related deaths as per CDC’s instructions to be provided at a later time.

n. ID Epi will monitor the number of pneumonia and influenza hospitalizations in each county using the hospital bed tracking system. This system allows hospital infection control to enter all data required to monitor novel flu at each hospital. ICP’s will enter the data into the electronic system, and ID Epi will tabulate that information. ID Epi will then use that data to estimate rates of influenza hospitalizations for each county.

4. **Wyoming Phase 4 (WHO Pandemic Period)**

   Widespread transmission in US states (but not in WY) and/or limited human-to-human transmission in WY.

   a. As resources allow, accept specimens from patients with a healthcare provider clinical diagnosis of influenza, particularly those with a positive rapid test. If needed, WPHL and ID Epi will create a priority testing plan under the direction of the SE, to be based upon the current disease situation and testing capabilities of PHL.

   b. Contingent upon adequate funding, pre-addressed Fed Ex shipping labels will continue to be provided to sentinel sites, and may, at the discretion of WPHL, be supplied to other primary care facilities. WPHL has established a courier system that provides daily pickup and delivery to 32 hospital locations throughout the state, with will-call pickup in an additional 3 locations. This courier system will become the secondary transportation route in the case of a pandemic. The courier provides pickups Monday through Friday. Locations of the courier sites and pick up times could be broadcast faxed to primary care facilities, providing overnight delivery of specimens to the laboratory.

   c. Laboratory algorithm: Once the first case of a novel strain is detected in WY, specimens will be tested initially by rRT-PCR for that H subtype, and specimens that are positive for that subtype will be immediately sent to the CDC until we are instructed to send no further specimens. As high volumes of specimens are encountered, the WPHL will work with ID Epi to determine a schematic for prioritization of testing. Specimens that are negative for the novel subtype will be tested by rRT-PCR for A and B, and will follow the algorithm established as indicated above.
d. Providers will be asked to report all Influenza cases, both clinical and laboratory diagnosed, to ID Epi. Reports will contain patient specific information as per routine disease reporting.

e. ID Epi will strive to conduct individual follow-up and confirmation for all persons who are laboratory confirmed positive for the novel strain.

f. ID Epi will continue monitor the syndromic surveillance system.

g. Consider a hospital beds-filled and beds-available surveillance system to locate and monitor available inpatient health care space by enrolling selected hospitals to monitor daily or weekly capacity.

h. Coordinate receipt of selected autopsy specimens for submission for testing.

i. Regularly provide materials to surveillance sources to convince them that their contributions are still essential because of the likelihood of a second and possible third wave of illness. ID Epi will monitor the number of pneumonia and influenza hospitalizations in each county using the hospital bed tracking system. This system allows hospital infection control to enter all data required to monitor novel flu at each hospital. ICP’s will enter the data into the electronic system, and ID Epi will tabulate that information. ID Epi will then use that data to estimate rates of influenza hospitalizations for each county.

j. CDC plans to require states to fill out forms for case reporting and fax them to CDC. As such, ID Epi will await CDC’s distribution of case report forms and the appropriate fax number. When those are available, ID Epi will complete the forms and fax them to CDC for each early case of novel flu.

5. **Wyoming Phase 5 (WHO Pandemic Phase)**

Widespread human-to-human transmission in WY.

a. Once a novel strain becomes established in a given Wyoming community (as determined by ID Epi), WDH will no longer recommend that all healthcare providers from that community submit specimens on all patients with a clinical diagnosis of influenza.

b. WDH will return to a sentinel-based surveillance system in which sentinel providers continue to submit samples from a representative portion of their patients with ILLI (eg. first 5-10 patients with ILLI per week) for trend monitoring. At this point, test results will not likely be clinically relevant and will only be used to monitor the epidemiology of the outbreak. This sentinel testing will help confirm or refute that continuing cases of ILLI are indeed due to the novel influenza strain (and not other common causes of respiratory illness), and will also provide baseline data on cases of Influenza between possible pandemic waves.
c. WPHL will only accept specimens from non-sentinels if determined to be clinically important for care.
d. Providers will be asked to report all influenza cases, both clinical and laboratory diagnosed, to WDH. Consideration may be given to only asking providers to report daily aggregate numbers of Influenza cases; in such a scenario demographic information on Influenza cases may be explored by looking at other databases such as syndromic surveillance, etc.
e. ID Epi will no longer be conducting individual case follow-up and confirmation on all cases.
f. ID Epi will continue to monitor the syndromic surveillance system.
g. Consider random telephone surveys of the population to estimate additional epidemiologic data such as attack rates.

6. Deceleration - During this interval, it is evident that the rates of pandemic infection are declining. The decline provides an opportunity to begin planning for appropriate suspension of community mitigation activities and recovery. General indicators of this phase might include low numbers (eg. <10%) of specimens submitted to the state public health laboratory positive for the pandemic strain for at least two consecutive weeks, or the healthcare system capacity is below surge capacity.

a. Continue sentinel-based surveillance system in which sentinel providers continue to submit samples from a representative portion of their patients with ILI (eg. first 5-10 patients with ILI per week) for trend monitoring. At this point, test results will not likely be clinically relevant and will only be used to monitor the epidemiology of the outbreak. This sentinel testing will help confirm or refute that continuing cases of ILI are indeed due to the novel influenza strain (and not other common causes of respiratory illness), and will also provide baseline data on cases of Influenza between possible pandemic waves.
b. WPHL will only accept specimens from non-sentinels if determined to be clinically important for care.

c. Providers will be asked to report all Influenza cases, both clinical and laboratory diagnosed, to ID Epi. Consideration may be given to only asking providers to report daily aggregate numbers of Influenza cases; in such a scenario demographic information on Influenza cases may be explored by looking at other databases (syndromic surveillance systems, etc.).

7. Resolution - In this interval, pandemic cases are no longer occurring, or occur only sporadically. Surveillance in this phase will be the same as for the Deceleration phase above.
C. Influenza Death Surveillance During a Pandemic

1. Currently all Influenza-associated deaths are required by statute to be reported to ID Epi within 24 hours, and will continue to be reportable during a pandemic.

2. All deaths, regardless of the cause, are required by Wyoming statute to be reported to the WDH Vital Statistics Services within 3 days of occurrence. This reporting system is electronically based. During a pandemic ID Epi will monitor and track the number of deaths daily. In the case that electronic data are not available, ID Epi will contact coroners and death registrars weekly to ascertain the number of deaths per county. In many instances the cause of death will be listed as pending in the initial reporting. However during a pandemic tracking the number of deaths will provide valuable information even if the specific cause is not known immediately.

3. County Vital Statistics Registrars will have access to an electronic internet based reporting system (Hospital Bed Tracking System) and will be asked to report on a daily basis the number of deaths in their county. The registrars will be asked to report the number of these deaths due to influenza or pneumonia if the cause is known. The ID Epi will monitor and track the number of deaths daily.

VIII. INFLUENZA DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

A. Isolation, Quarantine, and Community Mitigation Activities

Targeted isolation and quarantine of specific individuals as ordered by public health officials may be effective in slowing or even preventing spread of the pandemic influenza virus to others during the early stages of a pandemic (see Appendix E1 for example of a public health isolation order and Appendix F for example of public health quarantine order). Once the pandemic influenza virus becomes well established and there is widespread transmission in a community, targeted isolation and quarantine of specific individuals will be impractical and may have limited impact in the prevention of transmission of pandemic influenza due to the short incubation period of the illness, the ability of persons with asymptomatic infection to transmit the virus, and the non-specific nature of clinical illness from influenza. However, during periods of widespread transmission, a broad recommendation encouraging the voluntary isolation of persons ill with influenza (see Appendix E2 for example of voluntary isolation instructions), and the voluntary quarantine of household contacts during a particularly severe pandemic, will be made and will likely have some impact in decreasing the transmission of influenza.
In general, when isolation and/or quarantine is ordered by public health officials for specific individuals or groups, it is the responsibility of local public health officials to ensure that the subject has access to and is provided essential supplies and services.

Implementation of the community mitigation strategies discussed in this section may be based on the severity of the pandemic. A general guideline which WDH may use to implement such measures is the CDC Pandemic Severity Index (PSI) detailed in Appendix R.

1. **Wyoming Phases 1 and 2** (WHO Inter-pandemic and early Pandemic Alert Period)
   No WY cases identified.
   a. ID Epi and the PHEP will work with local government agencies to develop plans for mass isolation and quarantine which may be indicated in particular circumstances during a pandemic response.

2. **Wyoming Phase 3 and 4** (WHO Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods)
   May include sporadic epi-linked cases in WY; widespread transmission in U.S (but not in WY); or limited human-to-human transmission in WY.
   a. Confirmed or suspected influenza cases (including those with negative tests, but with a strong epidemiologic suspicion and no alternate diagnosis) should be isolated (see Appendix E1).
      i. Isolation may be at home, or if medically necessary, in a hospital for a period of time to be determined based on current epidemiology; or until the infection is laboratory-confirmed not to be caused by a novel influenza A virus.
      ii. Those isolated at home may be given a letter detailing instructions for home isolation (Appendix E1).
      iii. Treatment of influenza using neuraminidase inhibitors is most effective if given within 48 hours of symptom onset. If clinically indicated and supplies allow, antiviral treatment should be initiated as soon as possible even if laboratory results are not yet available.
      iv. Alternative isolation plans for individuals in nursing homes, dormitories, etc. will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by local authorities.
      v. In the event of travel related isolation and quarantine (e.g. buses, planes), appropriate facilities as outlined in the WDH Smallpox Response Plan will be utilized. Local
government agencies will be primarily responsible for providing all necessities
associated with isolation and quarantine of travelers (e.g. food, clothing, medical care).

b. If epidemiologically indicated to protect public health, consideration may be given to the
quarantine of close contacts of cases (and their contacts, if warranted) (see Appendix F).
Close contacts shall be defined as those who have shared a defined setting (households,
extended family, hospital, other residential institution, military service, or other close
prolonged contact) with a patient with proven or suspected novel influenza A infection.
   i. Quarantine of contacts may be at home for a period of time to be determined based on
current epidemiology of the virus under the direction of the SHO or designee, but may
be up to 10 days or longer.
   ii. Those quarantined at home may be given a letter detailing instructions for home
quarantine (Appendix F). Alternative quarantine plans for individuals in nursing
homes, dormitories, etc. will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by local authorities.

c. Prophylaxis of close contacts shall be under the direction of the SHO or County Health
Officer. Post-exposure prophylaxis might be useful in attempts to control small, well-defined disease clusters.

d. As resources allow, a local public health nurse, or WDH employee, will monitor those in
public health ordered home isolation/quarantine on a daily basis by phone.

e. At the direction of the SHO or designee, discourage or cancel large gatherings in the affected
town/county and encourage those with respiratory illness to stay home from work, school,
etc., depending on the level of person-to-person transmission.

f. One possible control measure that could be recommended to help mitigate the effects of
pandemic influenza on a community is the closing of schools, pre-schools, and daycares.
While the closing of schools, pre-schools, and daycares may indeed eliminate a large
gathering, such an action is not without potential complications and should not be entered
into lightly. For these closures to be effective they must be implemented early in a pandemic
(before widespread transmission) and be maintained throughout the entire time the pandemic
virus is circulating in a community. This will likely be 1-2 months at a time for each
pandemic wave, and possibly for 2 or 3 separate waves. Another complicating factor is that
to be effective, these closures must NOT result in large gatherings of children, such as out-of-home childcare with multiple children or gathering at a popular spot such as a shopping
mall. Another concern about closing schools, pre-schools, and daycares is the potential
adverse effect this may have on the ability of a community to provide essential services.
Such closings have the significant potential to result in many adult workers having to stay home to care for children, and could result in lost income.

If the epidemiology suggests the pandemic is moderate or severe and that children are at particular risk of severe disease, then based upon guidance from public health officials consideration should be given by schools, pre-schools, and daycares to cancel services or classes in traditional classroom settings in an attempt to mitigate the disease impact in children. The WDH along with the Wyoming Department of Education will coordinate with neighboring state health and education entities regarding school closures.

It is possible, however, that WDH officials may recommend or even order the closure of schools, pre-schools, and daycares based on the epidemiology and transmission of the pandemic influenza strain. This may occur, for example, if the illness is believed to cause unusually severe disease in children. Public health officials, including the County Health Officer and SHO, have authority to order the closure of schools and other venues to protect public health (WY statute 35-1-240).

It is likely the decision whether or not to close schools, pre-schools, and daycares will be largely made by local school officials, public health officials, and parents. Such a decision will be dependent upon the school’s contingency plans for closure, anticipated effect on the community, extent of illness in the community, number of healthy staff and students, and parent’s willingness to send their children to these facilities.

Every school district should anticipate the possibility of closing traditional classroom settings during a pandemic and have contingency plans in place. These plans must be actively communicated to the parents and the community.

g. Colleges and universities should anticipate the canceling/postponing of events that result in large gatherings such as sports and cultural events and large classes. Strong consideration should be given to closing dormitory type student housing if the pandemic is epidemiologically considered moderate or severe in an attempt to mitigate the disease impact in college students.

3. **Wyoming Phase 5** (WHO Pandemic Phase)

   Widespread human-to-human transmission in WY.

   a. At this stage of the pandemic targeted isolation and quarantine of specific individuals will be impractical and may have limited impact in the prevention of transmission of pandemic influenza. However, during periods of widespread transmission a broad recommendation encouraging the voluntary isolation of persons ill with influenza will be made (see Appendix
E2 for example of voluntary isolation instructions). Voluntary isolation of all persons with influenza-like illness (ILI) should be encouraged. Instructions such as those in Appendix E2 could be given to every person with ILI by both public and private healthcare providers.

b. Control efforts should focus on community-wide containment measures.

c. At the direction of the SHO or designee, discourage or cancel large gatherings in the affected town/county, or order that non-essential personnel not go out in public, depending on the level of person-to-person transmission.

d. WDH will encourage those with respiratory illness to stay home from work, school, etc. Closing of schools, pre-schools, daycares, and some college/university settings could be considered as per the discussion above (2f and 2g).

e. During a particularly severe pandemic public health officials may recommend the voluntary quarantine of household contacts of a person ill with influenza. The period of voluntary quarantine will be determined during the actual pandemic based on epidemiologic information, but may be for a period of 7 days after illness onset in the ill person.

4. Deceleration - During this interval, it is evident that the rates of pandemic infection are declining. The decline provides an opportunity to begin planning for appropriate suspension of community mitigation activities and recovery. General indicators of this phase might include low numbers (eg. <10%) of specimens submitted to the state public health laboratory positive for the pandemic strain for at least two consecutive weeks, or the healthcare system capacity is below surge capacity. State health officials may choose to rescind community mitigation intervention measures in selected regions within their jurisdiction, as appropriate; however, mathematical models suggest that cessation of community mitigation measures are most effective when new cases are not occurring or occur very infrequently. Actions taken may include:

a. Continue some or all mitigation actions as above (Peak/Established Transmission)

b. Assess, plan for, and implement targeted cessation of community mitigation measures as appropriate

c. Initiate targeted cessation of surge capacity strategies

d. Maintain aggressive infection control measures in the community

5. Resolution - In this interval, pandemic cases are no longer occurring, or occur only sporadically. Actions taken may include:

a. Continue/initiate actions as above (Deceleration)

b. Rescind community mitigation interventions
c. Prepare for possible second wave

d. Continue to promote community mitigation preparedness activities on standby for second wave

e. Conduct after-action review for lessons learned

f. Replenish stockpiles/caches as able

B. Infection Control

WDH has previously developed basic influenza infection control guidelines for the public and for schools, which are available on the WDH website. In addition, WDH can promote CDC-developed influenza transmission prevention strategies (Table 3). For more information on infection control in healthcare facilities, reference Appendix K.

**Table 3: Influenza Transmission Prevention Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decrease potential for contact</th>
<th>Healthcare Setting</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Private rooms or cohorting with other influenza patients</td>
<td>• Provide advisories or limit travel to areas where a novel influenza strain is circulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Negative pressure room when performing high-risk aerosol-generating procedures, if feasible</td>
<td>• Cancel large group gatherings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Designate specific wards or hospitals for admission of patients</td>
<td>• Close schools and/or businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimize transportation of patients</td>
<td>• Encourage telecommuting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limit number of healthcare workers caring for influenza patients</td>
<td>• Limit availability of public transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limit number of visitors to influenza patients</td>
<td>• Avoid unnecessary hospital visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental decontamination for influenza following existing guidelines</td>
<td>• Discourage hand shaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Decrease potential for infection if contact occurs</strong></td>
<td>• Quarantine of contacts of cases early in the pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vaccination of healthcare workers</td>
<td>• Stay home if ill with influenza like symptoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Antiviral chemoprophylaxis for healthcare workers</td>
<td><strong>Hand hygiene</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strict hand hygiene</td>
<td><strong>Respiratory/cough etiquette</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Respiratory/cough etiquette</td>
<td>• Vaccination or antiviral treatment or chemoprophylaxis per priority groups, if available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Standard and droplet precautions including use of gowns, gloves, and masks by healthcare workers and visitors to influenza patients, plus use of N-95 respirators by healthcare workers with direct patient contact if possible (see Appendix K)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Mask and respirator use in non-healthcare settings during a pandemic

The benefit of wearing masks by well persons in public settings has not been established. Mask and respirator use may somewhat decrease, but will not eliminate, the chance of becoming infected, and use is not a substitute for social distancing or other personal protection measures. The first and most important steps in reducing one’s risk of pandemic influenza are to limit close contact with others as much as possible and to practice good hygiene. These measures should be used at all times, regardless of whether a facemask or respirator is worn.

Individuals considering surgical mask or respirator use must consider that improper use may actually increase the transmission of illness to themselves or others. In addition surgical mask and respirator use by an untrained person can be uncomfortable, stressful, and has the real potential to exacerbate underlying chronic respiratory or heart conditions. In addition the supply of masks and respirators available to the public may not be enough to allow stockpiling by everyone. For persons who make the individual choice to include mask or respirator use in their protection strategies, masks and respirators are usually available for purchase at pharmacies or medical supply stores.

Persons in non-healthcare or non-emergency medical services settings, for example the general public where close, direct contact with persons known or strongly suspected to have the pandemic influenza strain is not expected, may wish to consider mask or respirator use in the following situations:

a. When there is evidence of significant spread of pandemic influenza in a person's community, a facemask (e.g. surgical mask, procedure mask, isolation mask) could be used if entry into a crowded setting that lacks protective measures is unavoidable (e.g., mass transit or going to a crowded store to purchase essentials such as medications).

b. When it is necessary to have close contact (less than 6 feet) with someone who is ill with pandemic influenza – for example, to give care to a family member – one should use an N95 respirator or equivalent certified by the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) and consider specifically using a respirator model that also is cleared by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use by the general public in public health medical emergencies. Although fit testing programs generally are not available for the public, selecting an appropriate respirator, carefully following instructions for its use, and making sure that it fits tightly against the face are critical to ensuring the respirator provides protection. Because the material used to make respirators is denser than that used in facemasks, it may be
more difficult to breathe through a respirator. Persons who have heart or lung disease or other illnesses that affect their breathing should consult a healthcare provider before using a respirator.

c. Ill persons should use a facemask when they must be in close contact with others. Examples of such contact include when the ill person is being cared for at home or if they need to leave home to access medical care or manage other necessities.

Given the potential for the above scenarios to occur in a pandemic, it would be reasonable for each household to stockpile some facemasks and respirators. The purchase of masks and respirators to be used according to the above scenarios is an individual responsibility. Government supplies of masks and respirators will NOT be available to meet these needs.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has made recommendations to aid families and individuals in making decisions about using masks or respirators (Interim Guidance on the Use and Purchase of Facemasks and Respirators by Individuals and Families for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, http://aspe.hhs.gov/panflu/facemasks.html). With proper precautions, a single caregiver can use the same respirator several times over a day for brief care visits with the same ill person in the household, so a stockpile of 20 respirators per household would be reasonable. Decisions on stockpiling facemasks and the number to obtain would depend on a family’s situation and their expectation of the need for close contact in crowded settings during a pandemic. When worn, the outside of the facemask or respirator may become contaminated with secretions from an ill person; therefore care should be taken to keep the facemask or respirator away from others after use and to wash hands well after removing a facemask or respirator, or before putting on a previously used facemask or respirator. Never wash or disinfect disposable facemasks or respirators and never share used facemasks or respirators with others.

Several scientific studies currently are being done to investigate the level of protection against influenza that may be provided by respirators and facemasks and the ability of persons to correctly and consistently use these devices. This interim guidance may be modified based on the results from these studies.

In addition, Federal OSHA has published Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for an Influenza Pandemic (OSHA 3327-02N 2007) which discusses measures which can be taken in the workplace to reduce the exposure of workers to the pandemic influenza virus, including mask and respirator use.
General information on buying and wearing facemasks and respirators can be found at the FDA website http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ppe/maskrespirezors.html.

2. Protection for Workforce Sustainability –

County Public Health staff and hospitals determined their pandemic influenza personal protective equipment (PPE) needs. Preparedness funds were allocated to all 23 county public health nursing offices for purchase of the necessary PPE to sustain them during an influenza pandemic. County Public Health staff purchased large amounts of N95 masks; surgical masks; disposable gloves/gowns; head coverings; booties; face shields/goggles; hand sanitizer; soap/lotion; disinfectants; disposable thermometers; biohazard bags; Kleenex; alcohol wipes and other materials for these emergencies. The materials are stored in public health offices across Wyoming.

The WDH ID Epi leadership reviewed the needs of the WDH. The number of critical staff was determined and PPE was purchased and stockpiled for emergency use. Syringes and additional PPE were purchased to supplement county stockpiles and for use by essential state personnel.

IX. VACCINE DELIVERY

A. Annual Vaccination Campaign

1. Influenza and Pneumococcal Vaccine Distribution

The Wyoming Immunization Section within the Community & Public Health Division (CPHD) of WDH is responsible for routine ordering of all publicly purchased vaccines in Wyoming. These orders are placed through the CDC VACMAN (Vaccine Management application) and are transmitted through CDC to the national vaccine third party distributor, McKesson Specialty. Normal vaccines are distributed through the CDC third-party vaccine distribution contract CDC manages with McKesson. For Pandemic Influenza events, CDC allows each state to designate up to 100 ship-to sites for pandemic influenza vaccines. This is the option that is chosen for Wyoming.

Since all vaccines are routinely distributed through the nationwide CDC contract with McKesson, the state no longer provides the capacity for a local vaccine depot. There are limited vaccine storage refrigerators in the WDH headquarters facility; however, the Immunization Section no longer has staff available and trained properly for vaccine re-distribution and shipping. The nominal vaccine storage units still available at WDH headquarters reside in a
room that is kept locked after hours. All refrigerators that contain vaccine are equipped with locks. Temperatures are monitored twice daily. All vaccine storage units at local Public Health Nursing (PHN) offices are either equipped with locks or kept in a locked room. PHN offices will track any further distribution at the local level.

Standard operating procedures to safeguard vaccines during power outages include the availability of backup generators for the power refrigerators in the event of a power outage. All PHN clinics participate in the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program through the WIP. Staffs at PHN sites are trained in cold chain procedures and provide routine monitoring of vaccine storage unit temperatures twice each day. Routine quality control assessments are provided to PHN offices on an annual basis to ensure compliance with federal standards for cold chain, vaccine storage and handling, Standard Operating Plans (SOP), inventory accountability and back-up procedures. Vaccine storage temperature logs, doses administered reports and vaccine inventory accountability are routinely reported to the Immunization Section on a monthly basis for standard vaccines. These same procedures will be followed during a pandemic event. Additional vaccine storage sites are determined by each county, and documented in the individual county response plans. Units located at the WDH vaccine depot have backup power generators, while VFC providers have backup plans in the event of a power outage or refrigerator malfunction.

B. Vaccine Management During a Pandemic Response

The entire population will be susceptible and may require two doses of vaccine for full protection. This means that the state of Wyoming could potentially use up to 1 million doses. Even if the maximum amount of 1 million doses were to become available, it would most likely arrive in batches over an extended period of time. The amount of vaccine that will have to be managed by the Immunization Section will be affected by the following factors:

- Vaccine availability (the manufacturers’ ability to produce and distribute vaccine)
- The proportion of available vaccine that will be purchased and distributed by the public versus the private sector
- Amount of vaccine available for public purchase through federal contract(s)
- Amount of vaccine available for public purchase through contracts negotiated between the state and manufacturers
The proportion of influenza vaccine to be distributed and administered through the public versus the private sector is unknown. Specific locations, public and/or private, as well as the determination to use public and/or private healthcare staff to administer influenza vaccine will be at the discretion of each County Health Officer. The planned method is addressed in the individual county response plans. It is possible that during an emergency, the public sector will be given the responsibility for distribution of all vaccine. Control of vaccine distribution by the Immunization Section and PHN will help to ensure equitable distribution to priority groups regardless of income or access to care and will also facilitate distribution of vaccine to essential community servants. All vaccine available to the public sector will be administered during clinics held by local PHN offices, select physician offices or hospital facilities that have been identified by county PHN nursing offices. Discretion by the County Health Officer will be relied upon to determine the proportion of pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines that will be allocated for administration to further points of distribution within each county. Coordination of vaccine redistribution within each county will be addressed in the specific response plan of each county. Number of doses to be administered per shift will be determined at the local level and will depend on the number of doses available for administration at any one time, staff availability and the number of patients presenting. There is currently no methodology to determine the weekly allocation of vaccine for Wyoming, since this factor will likely be controlled by the availability of vaccine, the extent of disease morbidity and the pockets of disease that may be presenting by location in the state. Based on these unknown factors, Wyoming will fall back on the primary plan of allocating vaccine through a population based allocation distribution plan.

1. Ordering and Distribution

CDC will notify the Immunization Section of how much vaccine will be available for Wyoming through federal contract. Vaccine may also be available through contracts negotiated directly between WDH and vaccine manufacturers. Once the total amount of vaccine available is known, the Immunization Section will consult with the SHO and other WDH officials to determine how much vaccine will be distributed to each county. The Immunization Section will not be responsible for ordering or distribution of vaccine available to the private sector.

WDH has chosen the option of having pandemic influenza vaccine shipped directly from the manufacturers or the SNS, as appropriate, to designated PHN county clinics throughout the state. The WDH plan anticipates that vaccine shipments will be made on a population percentage basis. All allocation plans are predicated on a population based allotment. Shipments of vaccine
are targeted to county PHN offices on a population proportionate basis. This allocation plan is intended to be the same without regard to shipment schedules determined by CDC.

2. Allocation
The state will allocate vaccine to counties on a population-basis. A more detailed plan of allocation will depend upon the amount of vaccine Wyoming will receive from the CDC. The counties would then administer the vaccine according to CDC target group recommendations as supply allows. Each county will determine the vaccine distribution for their county allotment (county specific decision on how the vaccine for that county will be distributed to additional sites within that county).

3. Personnel
In order to process the additional doses of vaccine and the accompanying paperwork, staffing of WDH, in particular the Immunization Section, may have to be supplemented. Personnel to assist with vaccine management will be obtained through reassignment of WDH staff and/or hiring of temporary staff by the Immunization Section. The need for additional staff will depend upon the specific functional requirements for tracking vaccine distribution, supporting vaccine data processes and assisting other WDH staff in information management tasks during the event.

Local public health jurisdictions will provide primary management and coordination of vaccine administration, following vaccine priority guidelines, to the extent possible. Information is available in this document that outlines federal guidelines for vaccine priority categories and tiers.

Where public health infrastructure is not adequate to provide all administration of vaccine during a pandemic event, local health authorities have been authorized to supplement the needed personnel with private healthcare workers, institutions or agencies at their discretion. As the plans for each public health jurisdiction will be unique, these processes are outlined in the individual county health response plans.

Personnel needs for vaccine administration at county sites are documented in the individual County Response Plans. The development and oversight of the county plans is provided by the WDH Public Health Response Coordinators. Documentation of specific staffing and personnel back-up contingencies are in the County Specific emergency management plans. Development
and utilization of job descriptions and Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) for additional staff is at the discretion of each County Health Officer.

All PHN locations in Wyoming utilize the Wyoming Immunization Registry (WyIR). A Mass Immunization Module is routinely tested statewide during annual influenza campaigns to ensure that personnel are adept at using this data tool during a pandemic event. During the 2007-2008 annual influenza campaign, the Countermeasures and Response Application (CRA) Aggregate Reporting requirement was successfully piloted at two PHN clinics. This will be the basis for data accumulation for vaccines during a pandemic.

All PHN clinics operate under standards set by the CDC and VFC program for temperature monitoring, vaccine storage and handling, and vaccine inventory management. PHN clinics operate under Standard Operating Procedures and through Standing Orders from a supervising physician. These procedures are annually reviewed during routine audits of PHN clinics by Immunization Section personnel.

4. Vaccine Storage

Vaccine storage plans, back-up, security is site specific to each county PHN office. Local plans are in place to receive, document and monitor vaccines. Each county has a back-up contingency plan to address issues such as power loss or inadequate capacity at each site to ensure proper cold maintenance. PHN office personnel are trained in the receiving processes of vaccines, and adhere to standards for appropriate chain of custody. In counties where off-site mass immunization clinics will be offered, the personnel are trained in proper vaccine transportation procedures to ensure cold chain maintenance.

Where appropriate, individual county emergency planning activities have included the use of MOA, to provide for vaccination sites, security, crowd control and alternate vaccine storage. These procedures and MOA are included in the county specific emergency plans. These plans also include the staffing profiles and needs for vaccination sites and project the number of doses that can be administered per shift. Annual mass immunization exercises are conducted in conjunction with annual influenza clinics to test the capacity and staffing needs of each county.

5. Transportation of Vaccine to Sites Identified by Counties
Vaccines will be delivered to the primary county PHN offices by the vaccine manufacturers, the CDC national vaccine distribution process or other modality as identified by CDC. Any vaccine transportation needed in a specific county to facilitate vaccine delivery to residents is addressed in county emergency plans to ensure proper cold chain maintenance and security. If security during transport of vaccine is a concern, a law enforcement escort could be arranged.

6. Vaccination Clinics
   a. Staffing
      PHN offices may not have adequate staff to hold large-scale vaccination clinics. Volunteer agencies could be used to help with non-medical services such as data entry/data management, management of supplies, and others. Local agencies should contact private providers in their community to create a list of those willing to assist with vaccination administration in the event of a pandemic or other public health emergency. Additionally, the WDH PHEP have established a list of licensed nurses who have agreed to offer their services during a public health emergency and EMTs currently have legal authority to provide mass immunizations if approved by the vaccination clinic manager. Each county is responsible for addressing local security to protect vaccine at storage facilities and during transportation to vaccination sites, as applicable. These local security arrangements should include riot/crowd control, as deemed necessary at each county site.

   b. Alternate Clinic Sites
      PHN offices might not be large enough to accommodate a large immunization clinic. If this is the case, an alternate site should be identified. Any large, open-area building with handicap access and adequate parking would be adequate. Types of facilities recommended for large-scale vaccination clinics include schools, auditoriums, conference halls, and theatres. In many communities, facilities for vaccination clinics have already been identified for smallpox planning purposes (Appendix G). Local agencies may wish to establish Memorandums of Understanding with facilities in advance of a public health emergency.

      PHN offices might consider distribution points such as police or fire stations, hospitals, or mobile vans to target specific groups of high priority workers. PHN offices should consider having hospitals administer vaccine to their staff members. If clinic sites other than the health department are deemed necessary or preferable, local law enforcement should be sought as partners to help determine sites that can be secured.
c. Vaccine Accountability

The vaccine may be unlicensed and need to be used under emergency Investigational New Drug (IND) or Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) provisions. Such provisions call for strict inventory control and record keeping. All State provided vaccinations administered during clinics held by local PHN offices, select physician offices or hospital facilities that have been identified by PHN offices will be recorded in the WIP’s WyIR or via hand documentation on the Immunization Section State Stock Influenza Doses Administered and Inventory reports (DAR/INV). All PHN offices have access to this registry and have been trained to enter data into this system. All of the data entered into this system can be accessed by WDH staff. All hand documented DAR/INV reports should be submitted on a weekly basis by faxing to 307-777-3615. Record keeping is also critical in that each individual vaccinated may need to be re-vaccinated 2-4 weeks after the initial vaccination.

For all privately purchased vaccine, private providers administering vaccine will be asked to tally the number of doses administered to each of nine age groups and record the information on the Private Stock Influenza Doses Administered and Inventory reports form (Appendix H; in development). These forms will then be returned to the Immunization Section, where the information will be entered into a spreadsheet. Information on doses administered can be totaled and sorted on a daily basis. Adverse reactions to the vaccine will be tracked by PHN offices. A list of symptoms will be distributed to clinic patients advising them to notify their PHN office if adverse reactions occur. In turn the PHN offices will notify the State. The Immunization Section Clinical Coordinator (Joanna Briggs 307-673-8930) will serve as the Vaccine Safety Coordinator at the State level. The Immunization Section is working toward the goal of providing access to adverse event reporting screens in the WyIR, which would collect and transmit electronically all necessary information to the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). This capacity is anticipated to be activated by the end of CY 2008.

d. Clinic Supplies

Local public health officials may want to consider establishing a stockpile of non-perishable supplies that would be necessary to run a mass vaccination clinic. These supplies might include syringes, gloves, masks, alcohol wipes, etc.
7. Data Collection

Vaccine and vaccine recipient data will be collected through the WyIR. During a pandemic event, data will be collected through the WyIR via the Mass Immunization Module. This module is currently able to collect Aggregate Reporting data required by the CDC CRA and has been successfully tested during the CY 2007 influenza campaign. Registry data can be safely transmitted to CDC via the CRA in an electronic transmission. This functionality was also successfully tested during the CY 2007 and CY 2008 seasonal influenza campaigns.

Utilization of the Mass Immunization Module is tested on an annual basis by all PHN clinics during the seasonal influenza campaigns. The Immunization Section provides distance learning tools, and when needed, individualized training to all WyIR users on the basic registry system, as well as individual modules like the Mass Immunization data collection system.

WIP is developing resource planning to expand the capabilities of WyIR to all CRA data collection functions. With the necessary funding, this capacity could be completed by the end of CY 2009. A School Absenteeism Reporting module has been developed and tested. This module of the WyIR will be used to provide some low level, aggregate data by schools of the level of students not in attendance. This data may trigger additional disease epidemiology investigations.

The WyIR has also added a vaccine management module which will provide for more accurate vaccine inventory management. The development and testing of this module has been completed, but it has not been placed into a full production capacity in WyIR to date. The capabilities of this module may be fully operational to WyIR users by the end of CY 2008, contingent upon progress by CDC on new Vaccine Management Business Improvement Plan (VMBIP) software and operational procedure development.

The WyIR data software is available and in use at all PHN clinics. All clinics are equipped to enter and transmit data through the web-based registry application. The WyIR is HL-7 and PHIN compliant.

8. Targeted Recipient Groups
   a. Establishing Target Recipient Groups
In view of likely vaccine shortages, HHS, in conjunction with various advisory committees has formulated recommendations for high priority target groups for vaccination (see Appendix I). The order of these groups is based on a number of factors including the need to maintain those elements of community infrastructure that are essential to carrying out the pandemic response plan. Other factors include limiting mortality among high-risk groups, the reduction of morbidity in the general population, and the minimization of social disruption and economic losses. This list is subject to change depending on the epidemiological and clinical features exhibited by the actual pandemic strain and the availability of vaccine.

The latest recommendations from the federal government for vaccine target groups, is based on a model accounting for three different levels of intensity of a pandemic event: severe, moderate and less severe. In each of these conditions, a prioritized hierarchy for vaccination target groups has been recommended. The target groups are divided into four categories: Homeland and National Security, Health Care and Community Support Services, Critical Infrastructure, and General Population. Within each category, these target groups are sub-divided into 1 – 5 tiers.

During a pandemic event, all individuals within Tier 1 of any category are considered equal and will be the first individuals targeted for vaccination. After all Tier 1 individuals have been vaccinated, administration will begin on Tier 2 individuals. This process will continue through all tier levels, to the extent that vaccine is available. Tables in Appendix I indicate the vaccine targeting categories and tiers for each of the three pandemic severity conditions.

The Working Group will distribute the federal Priority Groups List to all healthcare providers that might administer vaccine. This list is to be used as guidelines for healthcare providers. However, the decision of who should and should not be vaccinated will be left to the discretion of the healthcare providers administering vaccine.

Wyoming National Guard personnel will receive vaccinations if they fall into the identified priority groups, for their county, as delineated in Appendix I. Wyoming National Guard personnel would also be eligible for vaccination if on a pandemic influenza mission and in a critical position with no backup. Military beneficiaries will be treated as other citizens and
will receive vaccinations if they fit into the identified priority groups as delineated in Appendix I.

b. Estimates of and Plans to Vaccinate Priority Group Members

WDH will work with PHN offices and local emergency management agencies to estimate how many persons fall into each of the established priority groups to help with planning efforts locally. PHN offices, in collaboration with their partners, will need to develop plans for vaccinating persons who fall into the priority groups. Each local jurisdiction will determine if priority group membership verification is desired and the standards to which the verification will be documented.

Current guidelines for priority vaccination groups are documented in Appendix I: HHS Vaccine Priority Group Recommendations. To the extent possible, all vaccine administration sites are expected to follow the prevailing recommendations on priority groups. The Immunization Section is working to develop electronic linkages between the CDC CRA application and the WyIR, which will be utilized to document information on a patient specific basis for doses administered, vaccine inventory data and priority grouping. This data is intended to be transmitted electronically to CRA through the Mass Immunization Module of WyIR within 48 hours of vaccine administration. Until these electronic documentation and reporting mechanisms are fully operational, pandemic influenza administration sites will rely on paper screening tools that meet CDC specifications. These screening tools are in development.

Each local jurisdiction may develop Memoranda of Agreements with other institutions, individuals and/or agencies to delegate vaccination activities within their jurisdiction, as appropriate.

c. Education Regarding the Priority Groups List

Special attention must be paid to educating the general public about the Priority Groups List for receipt of vaccine, including the rationale for the list, the process by which the decisions were made, and what other control measures people can take until vaccine is available for everyone.
X. ANTIVIRAL AGENTS

Because vaccine will likely not be available when the novel virus first affects communities, antivirals may play an important role for the control and prevention of influenza, especially during the period before vaccine is available. HHS is working to increase the stockpile of antiviral drugs (especially oseltamivir) in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Wyoming's share of this stockpile is approximately 75,000 courses. In addition, WDH has purchased approximately 52,000 additional courses of 75mg Tamiflu, 16,500 courses of 30mg Tamiflu and 5,500 courses of 45mg Tamiflu through a federal contract. This will provide a total public health stockpile of approximately 149,000 courses in Wyoming.

Recommendations for priority groups for antivirals have been established at the national level. The WDH Working Group is responsible for reviewing the recommended groups, developing Wyoming-specific guidelines, and distributing those guidelines to all physicians and pharmacists in the state. For publically available antivirals, WDH will develop a distribution and allocation protocol for target groups. As with vaccine, it will be critical to clearly communicate with the public about the rationale for priority groups. Coordination with and education of the private sector will be an important aspect of planning.

A. Background Information on Antiviral Agents

1. Four antiviral agents are approved for treatment of influenza: amantadine, rimantadine, zanamivir, and oseltamivir. All of the agents are also approved for prophylactic use in certain circumstances. However at this time it is recommended that amantadine and rimantadine NOT be used for treatment or prophylaxis of influenza due to increasing resistance of the virus to these medications.

2. Neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir) are effective against influenza A and B, and both are approved for treatment and prophylaxis of influenza virus. When treatment is initiated within 48 hours of illness onset, both drugs are effective in decreasing shedding and reducing the duration of symptoms of influenza by approximately one to two days compared with placebo. Distribution of drugs for therapy is a challenge given the limited amount available, the large number of points of care, and the need to initiate the course of treatment within 48 hours of onset of symptoms.

a. The choice of which antiviral medications to use, and whether to use for treatment or prophylaxis, will vary depending on the susceptibility of the influenza virus strain, the epidemiology of the disease, and medication availability.
b. Additional information on antiviral treatments and their use can be found in Part 2, Supplement 7 of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan.

B. Strategies for Antiviral Drug Use:

1. Because antiviral drug supply is limited, planning for the use of antiviral drugs will be based on defined goals and identified priority groups targeted to achieve those goals.

2. WDH will be flexible in deciding optimal use of antiviral drug supply based on the available supply, and the local impacts and epidemiology of the pandemic.

3. The duration of prophylaxis is estimated to be six to eight weeks if used while influenza is circulating in a community or may be longer. Because prophylaxis would be provided to a group of people who were at risk of exposure to the pandemic virus and its consequences, many of those who receive prophylaxis may not become infected and may not have become ill even in its absence. Therefore, for a given quantity of antiviral drugs, prophylaxis (if indicated) should be targeted to very specific and limited groups of people.

4. Use of adamantanes for therapy can lead to the development and subsequent spread of resistant influenza viruses. Based on recent experience with seasonal influenza, it is likely that the adamantanes will have limited benefit for treatment or prophylaxis in a pandemic.

5. The effectiveness of antiviral drug therapy when started more than 48 hours after onset of influenza symptoms is usually decreased; therefore initiation of treatment with antiviral medications more than 48 hours after onset should generally be reserved for special circumstances, such as severe illness.

6. HHS has devised some general recommendations on target groups for the use of antiviral medications during a pandemic when supply is limited, and WDH has adapted these for WY (see Appendix J). This priority group list is to serve as a guide for healthcare providers and public health officials and it is recommended that the use of antiviral medications in an influenza pandemic be guided by these priority groupings. These recommendations were developed taking into consideration the likely limited supply of antiviral medications, the fact that some groups of people are at higher risk for severe complications and death, and the need to maintain a community’s ability to provide essential services, such as healthcare. During an actual pandemic, these recommendations and resulting use of antiviral medications may change based on the pandemic characteristics and antiviral medication supply. In addition, use of public health stockpiles may vary from these target group recommendations in an effort to maintain critical public health and patient care infrastructure.
7. Given the large number of people in a community ill with influenza, local healthcare triage plans may need to give consideration to instructing mildly ill persons to stay home, and directing those with more severe illness or those persons in an antiviral treatment priority group (see Appendix J) to the appropriate level of care. Such a strategy will focus antiviral medications on individuals likely to benefit the most, reduce the burden on an overwhelmed healthcare system, and limit the number of persons exposed to individuals with influenza.

8. In addition to treatment of already ill persons, antiviral medication prophylaxis throughout the period of increased influenza activity due to the pandemic strain of certain groups of people may lessen the overall adverse impact on a community (see Appendix J). WDH has identified the following groups as persons for whom antiviral medication prophylaxis may be indicated if the supplies of antiviral medications in public health stockpiles are sufficient. It is important to note that public health stockpiles of antiviral medications are limited and may not allow for prophylaxis of persons in all these groups, or even all persons in any one group.
   a. Prophylaxis should be considered for critical healthcare workers (HCW), and EMS providers. Priority should be considered for workers with direct patient contact and staff required for effective provision of care.
   b. Prophylaxis should also be considered for public health (PH) workers who will be essential for administration and distribution of vaccine and antiviral medications, involved in influenza surveillance and implementation of control measures, and critical to maintain PH response to a pandemic situation (e.g. public health nursing, public health response coordinators, immunization program staff, epidemiologists, county health officers, public health laboratorians, and state health officer).
   c. Prophylaxis of highest risk outpatients who are at highest risk of severe disease and death could also be considered if supplies allow. This includes persons with hematopoietic stem cell transplants and solid organ transplants; those with severe immunosuppression due to cancer therapy or hematological malignancy; persons receiving immunosuppressive therapy for other illnesses (e.g., rheumatoid arthritis); persons with HIV infection and a CD4 count <200; persons on dialysis; and women who are in the second or third trimester of pregnancy.
   d. If supplies allow, prophylaxis of persons with unique roles in maintaining critical infrastructure and services to the community, and for whom there is inadequate back-up personnel to provide these services, should be considered. This may include, but not limited to, persons critical to public safety (e.g. law enforcement, fire, corrections, emergency management workers, etc) and to societal function (e.g. coroner, mortuary, utility, waste, transportation workers, elected officials critical to a pandemic response, etc). Persons in
these groups will largely be determined by county officials based or local supplies and needs.

e. Wyoming National Guard personnel will receive Antiviral medications if they fit into the identified priority groups, for their county, as delineated in Appendix J. Wyoming National Guard personnel would also be eligible for Antiviral prophylaxis if on a pandemic influenza mission and in a critical position with no backup. Military beneficiaries will be treated as other citizens and will receive Antiviral medications if they fit into the identified priority groups as delineated in Appendix J.

9. Appendix J contains a sample worksheet that local planners may use to help them evaluate the antiviral medication needs for treatment and prophylaxis in their community.

10. In the event of a pandemic, local healthcare facilities will be the primary entity responsible for the care and treatment of ill persons, as in a non-pandemic situation. It is therefore recommended that healthcare facilities and pharmacies maintain a supply of antiviral medications that could be used for the care of patients, and possibly prophylaxis of staff if part of their prevention strategy, as the availability of such medications allows. Current evidence indicates the facility supply should include oseltamivir (Tamiflu); however the facility supply does not necessarily need to be restricted to oseltamivir as other antiviral medications such as zanamivir (Relenza) may be effective against pandemic virus strains. In addition, at this time the antiviral medication available for public health stockpiles includes significantly limited supplies of pediatric dosages, so healthcare facilities and pharmacies should consider this need. While it is possible that public health stockpiles of antiviral medications may be available, relying solely on public health stockpiles would likely not provide sufficient amounts of antiviral medications and would not be the most efficient means of providing treatment to patients.

C. Activities by Wyoming Pandemic Phase:

1. Wyoming Phases 1 and 2
   a. Review and modify as needed the national recommendations for priority groups
   b. Quantify high priority populations for prophylaxis and therapy, and develop drug distribution contingency plans for the different possible distribution scenarios.
   c. Develop plans for ordering, storage, and distribution of a state stockpile.
   d. Develop plans for storage and distribution of federally purchased stockpile being held by the Strategic National Stockpile.
   e. Develop plans for education and notification of the medical community and of the public around appropriate prescribing information.
f. Consider developing data management system to track supplies, distribution, and use.

2. Wyoming Phase 3
   a. Consider convening the Working Group, the Advisory Group, and appropriate partners and stakeholders to review major elements of the antivirals plan. Modify plan as needed to account for updates, if any, on recommended target groups and projected drug supply.
   b. Notify the medical community of the status of the plan and antiviral availability.
   c. Disseminate antiviral use guidelines to the medical community and conduct training for public health staff involved in antiviral distribution protocols and procedures.
   d. Ensure that the human resources and logistics are in place to begin drug distribution and administration, taking into account the need for added staff due to illness.

3. Wyoming Phases 4 and 5
   a. Fully activate antiviral drug distribution plan.
   b. Implement data management system for antiviral distribution, use, and supply.

D. State Purchase of Antivirals (State Stockpile):
   1. Wyoming has a State stockpile of Fifty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighteen (52,718) courses of 75mg Tamiflu, 16,581 courses of 30mg Tamiflu and 5,527 courses of 45mg Tamiflu.
   2. Wyoming currently has an MOA with 2 RSS locations; they have been surveyed by CDC SNS personnel and was found adequate for this purpose. The location is warehouse operations that do this work. WDH feels this is a better route to go for SNS operations rather than trying to run an RSS with in house personnel who are not trained on warehouse operation. The RSS Manager is the actual warehouse manager.

E. SNS Stockpile:
   1. In addition to the Tamiflu we have purchased under the State Purchase Program, CDC is also stockpiling additional courses of the antivirals - Tamiflu and Relenza which will be distributed to each of the states as a result of an influenza pandemic. It is expected by consultation with CDC authorities and s state health leadership, this stockpile will be transferred to the States. This stockpile is identified as the “SNS Stockpile” as the delivery process would be through the SNS delivery system, as now established. The quantities of these two antivirals in the SNS stockpile are sent without selection options by the states.
2. Our plan is to have this shipment of Tamiflu and Relenza sent to our SNS RSS site (or alternate RSS sites as emergency circumstances may dictate).

3. Under the SNS Stockpile allocation, Wyoming expects to receive 59,861 courses of Tamiflu and 14,961 courses of Relenza.

4. The quantity of antivirals from the State Stockpile and the SNS Stockpile, as described above, will therefore total 149,652 courses. This total quantity is what CDC has determined based on the number of courses which would treat one-fourth (1/4) of our resident population at the time the formula was determined by CDC.

F. Distribution Plan:

1. State Reserve of Tamiflu – The WDH has determined to reserve five percent (5%) of the Tamiflu we receive from our State Stockpile purchase. This reserve will be held, by the State, for reallocation under emergency contingencies, use where needed to supplement the existing quantities provided to each county and/or for prophylaxis of state responders. This five percent (5%) will contain 2,636 courses of Tamiflu.

2. Statewide distribution will be per capita to each county based on 2005 data. Planning for local dispensing of AVs is ongoing and initial distribution will be to Public Health Nursing Managers and/or County Health Officers in the counties (contact lists maintained on WDH servers and within the WDH EOC).

3. State Stockpile Antivirals - The WDH has identified four state owned facilities strategically located within the State of Wyoming for the long term storage of the State Stockpile quantity of Tamiflu. Each of the long term storage facilities will receive five to seven county quantities of Tamiflu (based on county resident population numbers) for the counties close to the storage location. The identification of the long term storage sites and which county quantities of Tamiflu will be held at these storage sites is not provided in this written plan.

4. Upon imminence of a Pandemic in the US, the counties would be notified to secure transportation and security escort of their Tamiflu by going to the state owned storage site to pick up their quantity. We have notified representatives of the counties to make arrangements for this transportation and security so they will be prepared for this transfer from the state owned long term storage site to their county prior to an emergency.

5. SNS Stockpile – As mentioned above, our stockpile of Tamiflu and Relenza will be requested for delivery to our SNS identified RSS location. This RSS will repack the quantities of Tamiflu and Relenza into county allocations and batched according to the SNS distribution center locations throughout Wyoming. Our SNS RSS contractor will then, by their own trucks
deliver these county allocations to distribution centers. If the circumstances require, we will request assistance from the Wyoming Highway Patrol and/or Wyoming National Guard to assist as they can in transportation to the counties of these antivirals. Each distribution center will have AV allotments for their designated counties and the counties and distribution centers will be notified of their delivery schedule. Although the specifics of the RSS location are confidential, at the time of a pandemic, when security would be present around the RSS, we would announce to those who need to know the location of the RSS.

a. Appendix P details distribution of antiviral courses per county following delivery of the SNS stockpile antiviral medications.

b. Appendix Q details the Wyoming State Antiviral Stockpile

6. CDC is also preparing shipments of other medical support equipment, such as masks, gloves, respirators, ventilators to each state., The delivery plan for these shipments as well as the SNS Stockpile of Tamiflu and Relenza is currently under review by CDC. Most likely shipments will be a combination of antiviral medications and medical support equipment split into three shipments of 25%, 25% and 50% of the State’s allocation. We have not been advised of the quantity of these items we would receive. We are told the quantity would be dispersed to each State on a “Pro-rata” basis. In like terms, we would request delivery of these materials to our State SNS RSS for repackaging to counties based on population and/or other justified distribution process. These would also be delivered to each county as announced above through distribution centers.

7. All antiviral and stockpile materiel transfers will be documented (chain of custody)

8. Information on the reporting of adverse events related to antiviral medication would go out with medications to county public health officials for distribution to patients. Patients will be directed to call their PHN office and the reaction will be documented and forwarded to the WDH. WDH will utilize spreadsheets or databases to log and track adverse events. Currently, WDH does not have a CRA system in place to track antiviral adverse events but plan to review CDC’s web based CRA system and will work with county public health officials to implement.

9. If there is a new antiviral medication developed for use against a pandemic strain the state may need to follow IND or Emergency Use Authorization provisions. Any forms required by CDC can be duplicated to go out with antiviral medications and can also be duplicated at the local level if needed
XI. HEALTHCARE SURGE CAPACITY (see Appendix K and http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup3.html for more detailed guidance).

Maintenance of critical services and surge capacity issues in the health care system are addressed in the WDH EOP being worked on through the CDC and ASPR Hospital Preparedness Program Cooperative Agreements. The Working Group has been collaborating with the above groups to ensure that these groups consider pandemic influenza as a potential scenario in these planning efforts.

A. Estimate of Need for Healthcare Services

Although there is great uncertainty associated with any estimate of an influenza pandemic’s impact, the following estimates of the potential impact of an influenza pandemic on Wyoming are derived from calculations using the CDC software, FluAid 2.0. All of the following calculations are based on Wyoming population estimates from 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data. Table 4 contains estimates of the potential impact of the next influenza pandemic in Wyoming based on a 25% attack rate. The conservative estimates, labeled “1968 - type scenario,” were primarily generated using rates of influenza-related illness measured during the 1960s and 1970s. The high estimates labeled “1918-type scenario” were generated using rates of influenza-related morbidity and mortality from the influenza pandemic of 1918. (For more information on the model used to develop these projections see Meltzer MI, Cox NJ, Fukuda K. *The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United State: Priorities for Intervention.* Emerging Infectious Diseases 1999; 5: 659-71.)

Table 4: Total estimates, per health outcome, from the most severe scenario of potential impact of next influenza pandemic in Wyoming:
Gross Attack Rate* of 35% (172,824 clinically ill)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Severe scenario (1918 - type)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>3,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalizations§</td>
<td>15,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hospital beds needed§</td>
<td>18,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatients€</td>
<td>76,648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Gross attack rate = % of WY pop assumed to become clinically ill with influenza during the next pandemic.
§ As a health outcome, the term “hospitalizations” refers to those who are hospitalized due to influenza-related illness but survive (i.e., their end health outcome is hospitalization). However, a percentage of those who will die from influenza-related illnesses are likely to die in hospital. Thus, total hospital beds required will be the sum of hospitalizations + deaths in hospital. We have assumed, for the sake of illustration that 70% of influenza-related deaths will occur in hospital.
€ Outpatient visits is calculated by (total symptomatic-deaths-hospitalizations)*% seeking care. It is assumed that approx 50% will seek care.
B. Evaluation of Existing Healthcare Infrastructure and EMS

The Wyoming Hospital Preparedness Program requests that all Wyoming hospitals provide information on a variety of performance measures and data elements, all of which measures surge capacity. Data collected includes NIMS compliance status; exercises and training activities; HAveBEd System requirements; communication capability; volunteer capability; fatality management planning; evacuation planning; bed surge capability; pharmaceutical supplies, decontamination capability, personal protective equipment and supplies, i.e. ventilators, etc. Data collection from hospitals is collected at a minimum bi-annually. The data elements collected via the HavBED System and the Volunteer Registry are web-based and can be collected on an as needed basis. The State of Wyoming has in place the Hospital Bed Tracking System which tracks diversion status, bed availability (adult, pediatric, burn, OR, psychiatric, ICU, trauma), decon capability, ventilators and can be customized to track other components such as number of Influenza Like Illness patients, number of pneumonia patients and number of deaths.

The State Office of EMS is responsible for the collection of data from each ambulance patient care report (Wyoming Patient Care Report) as well as data collected from the Wyoming Trauma Registry. Both systems collect patient data which can be used for surveillance purposes.

Wyoming Hospitals are required to develop and exercise pandemic influenza plans and funding has been allocated to accomplish this goal. Within their plans, hospitals have been requested to address their establishment of pharmaceuticals cache’s for patients, employees and employee families’, medical equipment and supplies and staffing capabilities. In addition, their plans should address alternate care sites and fatality management. Hospitals are also expected to participate in at least one pandemic influenza exercise per year, preferably a community based exercise.

The State of Wyoming participates in the ESAR-VHP Program (Emergency Systems for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals). This program will effectively facilitate the use of volunteers in local, State and Federal emergency responses. Wyoming’s system is web-based, and provides for the credentialing and verification of potential healthcare volunteers. This system is in compliance with the ESAR-VHP Program and provides for the augmentation of the healthcare workforce.

During a pandemic, disruptions in the availability of EMS equipment, supplies and services will occur statewide. Mutual Aid agreements between EMS services in state as well as inter-state have
been developed to address these gaps. The Wyoming Board of Medicine directs EMS authorized acts and/or scope of practice. Wyoming EMS Rules defines the authorized acts which can occur during a pandemic or other public health emergency.

The State Office of EMS will provide technical support and assistance to ambulance services and hospitals in their efforts to restore equipment, supplies and pharmaceuticals after an event. The State Office of EMS does not maintain a cache of these items, but can serve as a resource and negotiator in the recovery process.

State and local EMS agencies will integrate pandemic influenza surveillance, mitigation and response into their EMS response system. An EMS system’s response to pandemic influenza should be flexible, scalable, dynamic and timely with the ability to change rapidly based on new information about the virus and other public health emergencies. EMS must be present during state and community level planning and an active participant in drills and exercises. The EMS response will include medical direction, quality improvement, education, training, communications, coordinator and appropriate supplies and personal protective equipment. Local EMS agencies have been referred to the “Emergency Medical Service and Non-Emergent (Medical) Transport Organizations Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist” provided by the Centers for Disease Control, to assist in their plan development.

The State Office of EMS will develop statewide EMS pandemic influenza recommended guidelines and protocols for local/community based emergency medical services. These recommended guidelines will address medical direction, quality improvement, education, training, communications, coordination and appropriate supplies and personal protective equipment and will address all patient populations including children, the elderly and those with special needs.

The State Office of EMS will develop a EMS pandemic influenza plan that addresses the recommended guidelines for local EMS as well as defining the planning to be conducted at the State Office of EMS; defining the role of the State Office of EMS in Pandemic Influenza Surveillance and Mitigation; development of and incorporating a EMS COOP; legal authority defined; defined clinical standards and treatment protocols and EMS Workforce Protection.
C. Maintenance of Healthcare Services (see Appendix K for more detailed guidance)

Healthcare facilities must be aware of their responsibilities regarding pandemic planning and response. Guidelines for healthcare facility management (including infection control recommendations) during an influenza pandemic are available (Appendix K and http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup3.html). These guidelines have been distributed to the twenty-seven hospitals, clinics and two Veteran Administration Medical Centers.

Interoperable communication systems are continuously improving within the State of Wyoming; on a state-wide basis, hospitals have the ability to communicate via radio (as well as phone) with their local ambulance service; fire; law; emergency management and public health; the ability to exchange data is limited to fax, internet and hand-delivered. The purchase of radio’s and radio base stations has been conducted on a standard based approach, with all equipment being APCO Project 25 compliant as well as compatibility with the WyoLink program (state-wide communication project). Communication protocols exist within the state, with planning for redundancy a top priority. With Wyoming being a frontier state, communication challenges exist daily i.e. cell phone coverage is sporadic state-wide, weather affects electrical availability (power outages are common statewide), geographically, mountain ranges prohibit cell phone and/or radio usage and satellite phone usage; data can be exchanged between healthcare entities (under perfect weather conditions) via telephone, radios, (including the use of ham radios), internet (email), USPO and hand-delivered messages.

There will likely be a significantly increased demand for ventilator support and other critical care needs during a pandemic, likely beyond the usual capacity of healthcare facilities. *Triage decisions for critical care access and ventilator support will be the responsibility of the local healthcare system, including healthcare providers and facilities.* It is highly recommended that healthcare providers and facilities develop triage protocols to help ensure the most beneficial use of critical care resources. Healthcare personnel will be affected by illness at least as much, if not more than, the general population. Given that assumption, there will be high absenteeism rates among healthcare staff, at least until a vaccine becomes available. While retired healthcare providers and volunteers can be called on to assist in the care of the ill, it is likely that much of the care will become the responsibility of families, whether the patient is at home or in the hospital. *Guidelines on “How to Care for Family Members at Home”* have been distributed to hospitals and other healthcare entities such as emergency medical services and clinics. Local healthcare triage plans should have the goal of instructing mildly ill persons to stay home, and directing those with more severe illness or those
persons in an antiviral treatment priority group (see Appendix J) to the appropriate level of care. Such a strategy will focus antiviral medications on individuals likely to benefit the most, reduce the burden on an overwhelmed healthcare system, and limit the number of persons exposed to individuals with influenza.

County public health plans may utilize the following tools to disseminate information to the public regarding healthcare triage:

- National Weather Service/NOAA can be used by Public Health to get information out to the public.
- Reverse 911 (or similar systems such as "City Watch" and "Code Red")
- 311 hotline
- Local radio stations, cable t.v., and newspapers
- County public health websites
- Hospital websites
- Computerized signs at banks and schools
- Phone hotlines: a few counties have this available to them; others don't at this time.
- Answering machines
- Triage centers to screen people before they are sent to the hospital

**Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) ventilator policy** - Wyoming is projected to receive 7 ventilators from the CDC SNS. The following policy has been developed by the WDH for distribution of these limited ventilators.

1. Requests from county EOCs, hospitals or public health must go to the WDH SNS Coordinator through the county EOC.
2. The SNS Coordinator will gather data on the number of requests received and the number of ventilators available.
3. SNS Coordinator will work with the WDH Hospital Preparedness Program Coordinator (HPPC) to:
   a. Confirm with hospital the need for the ventilator to include:
      i. are all available ventilators in use
      ii. does the hospital have critical patients in need of the ventilator now
      iii. does the hospital have respiratory therapy staff to adequately operate the requested ventilators
4. The SNS Coordinator will discuss the request and above information with the WDH Incident Commander and Operations Chief
5. In general the request for ventilators will be filled in the order they are received with the following caveats:
   a. There must be a demonstrated need
   b. If multiple facilities are requesting ventilators, each facility may not get the number they request. WDH will try to spread the ventilators out so each requesting facility can have at least one (until supplies are exhausted, by order of request).
   c. If the entire allotment of SNS ventilators are requested by only a small number of facilities the HPPC may be directed to do a needs assessment to determine needs of other facilities.

XII. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Protocols for Information Dissemination

1. The WDH Public Information Officer (PIO) will oversee all public information and media relations activities for WDH in coordination with the governor’s office, WOHS, other involved state agencies and local personnel. The WDH PIO has been trained in emergency and risk communications and principles. Designated and trained back ups for the WDH PIO are the Preventive Health and Safety Division administrator and the WDH deputy director of administration.

2. Working with the WDH PIO, the WDH Emerging Diseases/Health Statistics Section will lead the development and release of any pandemic influenza-related materials or information to the public, state employees, healthcare community, and media under the direction of the State Epidemiologist, the State Health Officer and their designees.

3. The State Health Officer, the State Epidemiologist, and the WDH PIO (or their designees) will serve as the principle spokespersons for WDH.

4. On the local level, the County Health Officers (or their designee) will serve as the spokespersons and subject matter experts under the direction of the SHO.

5. A WDH group comprised of the WDH PIO, State Epidemiologist or his designee, State Health Officer and representatives from the Emerging Diseases/Health Statistics Section will review message and content of materials used for public information and media activities such as talking points, fact sheets and news releases before distribution. In the event that time is of the essence, the group may be abbreviated to include a smaller number of reviewers.

6. Information, news releases, materials and recommendations developed by WDH will be shared through WARN and other methods and will be regularly updated with county health officers, public health nursing managers and public health response coordinators to encourage consistent public messages.
7. WDH will use mass media methods to proactively distribute public information and recommendations to Wyoming residents. These earned media methods include but are not limited to media advisories, news releases (includes radio actualities), media interviews, media conference calls, press conferences, Wyoming Alert and Response Network (WARN) messages and the WDH website. The WDH PIO will recommend the most appropriate communication method for the situation and the message.

8. If funds allow and if deemed necessary by the WDH PIO and other key WDH personnel, paid mass media advertising will be used to support distribution of key messages for the public.

9. For healthcare professionals and other emergency personnel, tactical communications specialists from the WDH PHEP will use the WARN or backup systems, to distribute alerts and other messages to public health employees, infection control practitioners, emergency rooms, clinics, physicians, local health departments, hospitals, coroners, vital statistics offices, department of defense, and others.

10. In addition to proactive media and information activities, it is recognized that other communications methods will be needed to respond to the needs of the public and healthcare professionals on a reactive basis. The WDH Public Information Officer will work with WDH tactical communications specialists to determine the most effective methods depending on the situation.
   a. A WDH toll-free hotline will be used to respond to public inquiries. This phone line will use virtual call center technology and will be staffed by existing, redirected WDH personnel.
   b. A different WDH toll-free hotline will be established by the Emerging Diseases/Health Statistics Section staff to respond to calls from healthcare professionals.
   c. Web pages specific to the pandemic will be posted on the WDH website and highlighted on the WDH home page. These pages will be promoted as a primary information resource for the public.

11. The Wyoming governor's press secretary, working with the WOHS PIO, has responsibility for state-level JIC activation and operations. If state-level JIC is activated, the WDH PIO will participate in state JIC. See Wyoming Joint Information Center (JIC) Implementation plan from the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security.

12. For non English speaking populations, WDH will use translated materials provided by the CDC for general messages and regular situational updates. For Wyoming-specific messages, messages will be translated through resources available from the WDH Office of Multicultural Health.

13. Outreach to special needs populations for messages will be accomplished through cooperative efforts between the WDH PIO, the WDH Developmental Disabilities Division and local health representatives. CDC resources will also be used as appropriate.
14. Outreach and targeted messages for senior citizens will be accomplished through cooperative efforts between the WDH PIO, the WDH Aging Division and its network of local senior centers and service representatives, and local health representatives.

15. Statewide media contact lists for newspaper, radio and television outlets are maintained by the WDH PIO and are updated at least quarterly. These media lists are available to WDH PIO backups and other key WDH leadership personnel on a shared network drive by posting on the WARN. Media lists include reporter information; various contact numbers and email addresses.

16. Personnel and contact information for partner state agency PIOs is maintained and available from the WOHS on the Web EOC system for easy access by duty officer and other key personnel in an emergency situation. Wallet cards are also provided by WOHS with same information. Local emergency and federal contact information is also available through Web EOC. Local emergency leadership, public health and healthcare contacts are maintained and available through WARN.

B. Activities by Wyoming Pandemic Phase

1. Wyoming Phases 1 and 2; Inter-pandemic and Pandemic Alert Periods
   a. Continue identifying and training state and local spokespersons (and backups).
   b. Continue developing risk communications messages and updating and adding to existing pandemic influenza frequently asked questions master document. This document to serve as master source of pandemic influenza information and messages. Review CDC materials as they become available. Adapt and revise as needed.
   c. Further develop plans for coordination of messages between state and local public health officials, and all involved partners. Develop recommendations and cost estimates for potential paid advertising during later pandemic phases such as targeted radio and television commercials and a statewide tabloid newspaper insert for more detailed information.
   d. Continue educating public health officials, community leaders, the media and the public with messages about pandemic influenza (emphasis on planning) primarily through appropriate earned media opportunities. Continue educational efforts as appropriate through special paid projects such as mailings or limited newspaper advertising.
   e. Test alerting and notification tools quarterly.
   f. Further develop pandemic influenza website content.
   g. Develop Health Alert messages that can be easily modified
   h. Train public health partners in use of collaboration tools, including WARN portal.
i. Develop home health care guidelines for pandemic influenza to include information on caring for ill family members at home, when to seek professional medical help and what to do and how to cope if someone dies in the home.

j. The WDH PIO will participate in biannual state-level JIC exercises as directed by governor’s press secretary and WOHS PIO. (The last exercise was May 2008.)

2. Wyoming Phase 3; Pandemic Alert Period

a. Because professional public health PIOS are not available at the local level in Wyoming, confirm with each county emergency and/or public health leaders who will be serving as PIO for the likely imminent pandemic. Establish and maintain contact lists for these designated PIOS and other county emergency and/or public health leaders. Establish working process with these designated PIOS for coordinated communications.

b. If the state health officer and/or state epidemiologist recommend advising Wyoming residents to avoid travel to certain affected foreign countries or other states, distribute these advisories to the public through earned media methods as needed.

c. Decide whether to use paid media advertisements at this time to emphasize key messages for the public. If deemed appropriate, purchase broadcast time and newspaper space and run advertisements.

d. Key messages for both earned and potential paid media methods as previously described to include information on how to limit and reduce the spread of the virus such as hand washing, covering coughs, staying home when ill, and avoiding large crowds. The previously established master frequently asked questions document will be updated, added to and used as a master source of information.

e. Review and modify developed materials and messages as needed. Distribute appropriate information and updates to the public through earned media methods on ongoing basis.

f. Distribute updates and recommendations to healthcare professionals, special needs populations in cooperation with WDH Developmental Disabilities Division, and senior citizens in cooperation with WDH Aging Division.

g. Distribute updates and recommendations to local public health for distribution to public transportation providers/operators, law enforcement and, other public service providers on infection control practices. Updates and recommendations will also be distributed on returning to normal operating levels and preparation for additional potential pandemic waves.
3. **Wyoming Phases 4 and 5: Pandemic Periods**
   a. Distribute appropriate information and updates to the public through earned media methods on an ongoing basis. Coordinate with other state agencies and local representatives.
   b. Activate additional content for pandemic influenza website as appropriate to phase and current situation.
   c. If the state health officer and/or state epidemiologist recommend that travel to certain Wyoming communities and/or counties be limited and/or restricted, the WDH PIO will work with Wyoming Department of Transportation (WyDOT) communications staff to share that information with the public. In addition to earned media methods such as news releases, interviews and other announcements, WyDOT may be asked to use their solar-powered dynamic messaging signs located all around the state for travel advisories.
   d. Activate virtual call center capabilities.
   e. Monitor media coverage and address misinformation.
   f. Consider activation of additional public notification tools outlined in Wyoming Department of Health Communication Binder
   g. Should a first wave of pandemic influenza slow, continue to use earned media methods to inform public of current status and recommendations while also educating about possible second and third waves of the virus.
   h. Work with professionals from the WDH Division of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services on appropriate public messages to address mental stress and fatigue from effects of pandemic and distribute through earned media methods.

C. **Communication Resources**

For Partner Communication and Alerting, WARN was installed in June, 2007. WARN also includes WYVOL – an ESAR–VHP volunteer registry and WYHCT – a hospital capacity tracking component. The WYHAN component, a PHIN–compliant tool, will to be used by Wyoming public health officials for alert dissemination and communication utilizing voice alert, pager notification and mass fax messaging, via a secure Web–based portal. WYHAN will also serve as an information repository and data–sharing portal. The selected solution can be integrated with WebEOC, a Homeland Security system. Training and outreach services will train our tribal and local public health partners, and we will be developing our "regional" HAN coordinators team.
XII. Appendices
Appendix A: Pandemic Influenza Working Group and Advisory Committee Members

Wyoming Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Working Group Members
All members may be reached by calling 866-571-0944

- State Health Officer Brent Sherard, MD, MPH
- State Epidemiologist Tracy Murphy, MD
- Deputy State Epidemiologist Joe Grandpre, PhD
- Public Health Laboratory Manager Jim Walford
- Emerging Diseases/Health Statistics Section Chief Clay Van Houten, MS
- Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer
- Representatives from Public Health Nursing Program
- Immunization Program Manager Jan Bloom, MS
- Influenza Surveillance Epidemiologist Reginald McClinton, MPH
- HHS Hospital Preparedness Program Coordinator Merit Thomas
- Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program Manager Angie Van Houten, MS
- State Public Health Veterinarian Karl Musgrave, DVM, MPH
- Public Health Emergency Preparedness Epidemiologist Chuck Hall
- WDH Public Information Officer Kim Deti
- Strategic National Stockpile Coordinator Bryon Hopper
- Representative from Pharmacy Program
- Representatives from Department of Education
- National Guard Members
- Representative from Wyoming Office of Homeland Security

Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee Members
Representatives from the following:
  - Governor's Office
  - Wyoming Office of Homeland Security
  - Wyoming Department of Health:
    - Director's Office
    - Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program
    - Emergency Medical Services Program
    - Infectious Disease Epidemiology Program
    - Immunization Program
    - Mental Health Division
    - Office of Rural Health
    - Pharmacy Program
    - Public Health Laboratory
    - Public Health Nursing Program
  - Wyoming Hospital Association
  - Wyoming Medical Society
  - Wyoming Board of Medicine
  - Wyoming Board of Nursing
  - Indian Health Services
  - Wyoming Department of Education
  - Wyoming Department of Corrections
  - Quality Healthcare Foundation of Wyoming
  - Wyoming Business Council
Wyoming County Commissioner Association
County Health Departments
Veteran’s Administration Hospitals
National Guard – Adjutant General or designee
Attorney General’s Office
Appendix B: Pandemic Influenza Planning Roles

Pandemic influenza planning is essential, but in order to plan effectively it is important to know what is being done at each level of the public health system. This fact sheet contains examples of planning roles at the federal, state, and local level.

Federal Planning Roles

- National and international surveillance
- “Pandemic Phase” declarations
- Development and use of diagnostic laboratory tests and reagents
- Development of reference strains and reagents for vaccines
- Vaccine evaluation and licensure
- Determination of populations at highest risk and strategies for vaccination and antiviral use
- Assessment of measures to decrease transmission (travel restrictions, isolation, and quarantine)
- Deployment of federally purchased vaccine
- Deployment of antiviral agents in the Strategic National Stockpile
- National adverse events surveillance system
- Evaluation of vaccine safety
- Deployment of Commissioned Corps Readiness Force and Epidemic Intelligence Service officers
- Medical and public health communications
- National information database/exchange/clearinghouse on the internet
- Development of the following:
  - Fact sheets on influenza disease, vaccine and antivirals
  - Strategies and guidelines for interacting with the media and communicating with public health agencies, medical communities, and the general public
  - Guidelines for triage and treatment of influenza patients

Wyoming Department of Health Planning Roles

- Development of state pandemic preparedness and response plan
- Coordination of state-wide influenza surveillance
- Vaccine and antiviral medication procurement and distribution plans
- Development of data management systems needed to implement components of the plan.
- Identification of essential service groups as first round vaccine recipients
- Statewide media messages
- Legislative/administrative measures
- Coordination with local areas to ensure development and exercise of local plans.
- Coordination with other state agencies
- Coordination with adjoining jurisdictions.

Local Planning Roles

- Development of local emergency operations plan
- Surveillance assistance as requested
- Vaccine and antiviral medication storage and distribution plans
- Identification of essential service persons as first round vaccine recipients
- Local emergency response
- Continuation of operations
Appendix C: Pandemic Planning Guidance for Local Public Health

Because pandemic influenza outbreaks are expected to occur simultaneously throughout much of the United States, shifts in human and material resources that normally occur with other natural disasters will not be possible. This unique challenge should be considered during pandemic influenza planning. This guidance document highlights a number of issues that should be considered during the pandemic planning process at the local level.

I. Command and Control

A. Inter-pandemic Period

☐ Identify persons/agencies responsible for writing and updating the plan.
☐ Determine how often the plan should be revised.
☐ Review existing emergency response or similar plans that have already been developed and determine how the pandemic plan can be incorporated into existing plans.
☐ Identify leaders and decision makers for pandemic response activities in your jurisdiction.
☐ Identify services which support pandemic response activities.
☐ Maintain resource lists of staff and services which support pandemic response activities.
☐ Identify essential services of your agency which must be continued during a pandemic.
☐ Identify who is responsible for documentation of costs of the pandemic response.
☐ Identify facilities within the jurisdiction that can be used to support response activities including:

1. Local Emergency Operations Center
2. Vaccination sites (small and mass clinics) and antiviral distribution sites
3. Vaccine and antiviral storage sites
4. Identify who is responsible for obtaining permission to use facilities.
5. Establish Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for facility use.

B. Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

☐ Identify public health and emergency management roles.
☐ Identify agencies with whom activities should be coordinated.
☐ Identify an individual or agency who will track the status of pandemic response activities
☐ Identify who re-assigns staff for pandemic response activities and who monitors staffing needs.
☐ Identify who is responsible for coordination with other local and state agencies.
☐ Have decision-makers meet to discuss local response activities.
C. Pandemic Over
   □ Identify who summarizes pandemic activities.
   □ Identify who decides when staff will return to usual activities.

II. Surveillance

*Surveillance is primarily a state public health activity; local public health may be asked to assist in disease surveillance.*

A. Inter-pandemic Period
   □ Support routine influenza surveillance activities of the WDH.
   □ Assist in identifying sentinel physicians and school nurses for surveillance.

B. Pandemic Alert Period
   □ Work with the WDH to ensure that all health care providers within your jurisdiction are aware of the recommendation to culture patients presenting with ILI with recent travel history to an affected area.

C. Pandemic Period
   □ Continue to work with the WDH to ensure that all health care providers within your jurisdiction are aware of the current lab testing recommendations.
   □ Assist with specimen collection and/or data collection as appropriate.

D. Pandemic Over
   □ Assist WDH in data collection for retrospective characterization of the pandemic.

III. Vaccine Management

*Obtaining vaccine, distribution to regional centers, and identification of priority vaccination groups is a state responsibility. Local agencies will be responsible for identifying persons in priority groups and administering vaccine.*

A. Inter-pandemic Period
   □ Develop contingency plans for mass and small vaccination clinics
      ○ Identify facility, storage unit, supplies, and staffing requirements.
   □ Develop a system in your jurisdiction to identify number of persons in priority groups for vaccination (reminder: coordinate with local emergency management).
   □ Identify an estimated number of persons in priority groups for vaccination based on job description
   □ Assist WDH to improve current seasonal influenza and pneumococcal vaccination efforts
- Make sure that all providers are aware of influenza and pneumococcal vaccine recommendations.
- Encourage providers to administer influenza and pneumococcal vaccine to ACIP recommended groups.

B. Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

*Before vaccine is available:*
- Identify individuals (actual people) in priority groups for vaccination as defined by the WDH.
- Develop standing orders.
- Identify sites to administer vaccine.
- Identify staff who can assess patients for eligibility.
- Identify staff who can administer vaccine and determine the need for volunteers.

*When vaccine is available:*
- Coordinate transportation and security with local emergency management.
- Use WDH Immunization Registry to track clinic participation, lot numbers.
- Use VAERS to track adverse vaccine reactions.

C. Pandemic Over
- Summarize pandemic influenza vaccination response
- Summarize lessons learned from vaccination efforts.

IV. Antiviral Management

*Obtaining antiviral medications, distribution to local centers, and identification of priority vaccination groups is a state responsibility. Local agencies will be responsible for storing and distributing antivirals.*

A. Inter-pandemic Period
- Develop contingency plans for storage and dispensing sites.
  - Identify facility, storage unit, supplies, and staffing requirements.

B. Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

*Before antivirals are available:*
- Develop standing orders as needed.
- Identify sites to distribute medications.
- Identify staff who can assess patients for eligibility.
- Identify staff who can distribute medications and determine the need for volunteers.
When antivirals are available:

- Coordinate transportation and security with local emergency management.
- Track medications dispensed using system that will be provided by WDH.

C. Pandemic Over

- Summarize pandemic influenza antiviral response
- Summarize lessons learned from mass distribution efforts.

V. Emergency Response

A. Inter-pandemic Period

- Inventory relevant medical supplies, facilities, and services in your jurisdiction.
- Identify individuals and agencies who will need to be notified within your jurisdiction.
- Identify individual responsible for make local recommendations.
- Identify who will be represented on local planning and assessment teams
- Identify local technical advisors.
- Determine who within local agencies should be notified (may want to develop contingencies for multiple vs. sporadic cases).
- Determine who outside of local agencies should be notified.

B. Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

- Notify agencies within jurisdiction.
- Have decision makers meet.
- Review current policies and new recommendations.
- Coordinate response activities with neighboring jurisdictions.
- Activate local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as appropriate.
- Refer to local and agency EOP plans.

C. Pandemic Over

- Review current policies, standing orders, and new recommendations.
- Coordinate response activities with other localities.
- Reduce staffing/close EOC as appropriate.
- Evaluate pandemic response.
- Summarize pandemic response and debrief.

VI. Communications

A. Inter-pandemic Period
☐ Identify personnel and agencies within the county to be notified during the stages of a pandemic.

☐ Determine communication network and responsibilities between local public health and local emergency management.

☐ Develop/coordinate communication with your jurisdiction’s health care professionals

☐ Coordinate media messages with state agencies and other local agencies.

☐ Identify deficiencies in your communications systems.

B. Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods

☐ Identify personnel within the agency to be notified.

☐ Develop/coordinate communication with health care professionals.

☐ Identify other agencies to be notified.

☐ Coordinate media messages with state agencies and other local agencies.
Appendix D: CDC Avian Influenza Follow-up Form

**Human Influenza A (H5) Domestic Case Screening Form**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Reported By</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date reported to state or local health department:</td>
<td>State/ local Assigned Case ID:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>__ / __ / __</td>
<td>m m d d y y y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last Name:</td>
<td>First Name:</td>
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<tr>
<td>State:</td>
<td>Affiliation:</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td>Fax:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2. Patient Information**

| City of Residence: County: State: |
| Age at onset: | Year(s) | Month(s) |
| Sex: | Male | Female |
| Race: (Choose One) | American Indian/Alaska Native | White |
| Asian | Unknown |
| Black | Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander |
| Ethnicity: | Non Hispanic | Hispanic |

**3. Optional Patient Information**

| Last Name: | First Name: |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Signs and Symptoms</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of symptom onset:</td>
<td>m m d d y y y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What symptoms and signs did the patient have during the course of illness? (check all that apply)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fever &gt; 38° C (100.4° F)</td>
<td>Fever (temperature not taken)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cough</td>
<td>Headache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sore throat</td>
<td>Other (specify):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was a chest X-ray or chest CAT scan performed?</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If yes*, did the patient have radiographic evidence of pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome (RDS)? | Yes* | No | Unknown |
Influenza A (H5) Domestic Case Screening Form 1.0 (continued from previous page)

Epidemiologic Risk Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arrival Date</th>
<th>Departure Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
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<td>Macao</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the questions 5B to 5E,
In the 10 days prior to illness onset, while in the countries listed above . . . .

B. Did the patient come within 1 meter (3 feet) of any live poultry or domesticated birds (e.g. visited a poultry farm, a household raising poultry, or a bird market)?  □ Yes* □ No □ Unknown **If Yes**

C. Did patient touch any recently butchered poultry?  □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

D. Did the patient visit or stay in the same household with anyone with pneumonia or severe flu-like illness?  □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

E. Did the patient visit or stay in the same household with a suspected human influenza A(H5) case?*  □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

F. Did the patient visit or stay in the same household with a known human influenza A(H5) case?*  □ Yes □ No □ Unknown

* SEE Influenza A (H5): Interim U.S. Case Definitions
Influenza A (H5) Domestic Case Screening Form 1.0
(continued from previous page)

6. Exposure for Non Travelers
   For patients whom did not travel outside the U.S.,
   in the 10 days prior to illness onset, did the patient visit or stay
   in the same household with a traveler returning from one of
   the countries listed above who developed pneumonia or severe flu-like illness?
   □ Yes* □ No □ Unknown
   If yes*, was the contact a confirmed or suspected H5 case patient?
   □ Yes* □ No □ Unknown
   If yes*: CDC ID: _____________________ STATE ID: ________________

Laboratory Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 1</th>
<th>Specimen 2</th>
<th>Specimen 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ NP swab</td>
<td>□ Bronchoalveolar lavage specimen (BAL)</td>
<td>Date Collected: _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ NP aspirate</td>
<td>□ OP swab  □ Other __________________________</td>
<td>m m d d y y y y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test Type: □ RT-PCR □ Direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) □ Viral Culture □ Rapid Antigen Test*

*Name of Rapid Test:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 2</th>
<th>Specimen 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ NP swab</td>
<td>□ Bronchoalveolar lavage specimen (BAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ NP aspirate</td>
<td>□ OP swab  □ Other __________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test Type: □ RT-PCR □ Direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) □ Viral Culture □ Rapid Antigen Test*

*Name of Rapid Test:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ NP swab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ NP aspirate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test Type: □ RT-PCR □ Direct fluorescent antibody (DFA) □ Viral Culture □ Rapid Antigen Test*

*Name of Rapid Test:
Influenza A (H5) Domestic Case Screening Form 1.0
(continued from previous page)

CDC ID:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 1:</th>
<th>Source*:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Clinical Material</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Extracted RNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Virus Isolate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sent: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 2:</th>
<th>Source*:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Clinical Material</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Extracted RNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Virus Isolate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sent: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 3:</th>
<th>Source*:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Clinical Material</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Extracted RNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Virus Isolate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sent: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 4:</th>
<th>Source*:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Clinical Material</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Extracted RNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Virus Isolate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sent: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specimen 5:</th>
<th>Source*:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Clinical Material</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Extracted RNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Virus Isolate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collected: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Sent: ___ / ___ / _______ m m d y y y y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Carrier: Tracking #: 

9. Case Notes:
# Influenza A (H5) Domestic Case Screening Form 1.0
(continued from previous page)

## CDC Contact Information (FOR CDC USE ONLY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case status and date status applied:</th>
<th>Ruled Out/Nor-Case:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinical Case (lab results pending)</td>
<td>m m d d y y y y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influenza A pos. Case (subtype pending)</td>
<td>m m d d y y y y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed Case</td>
<td>m m d d y y y y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reason:**
- Influenza A neg. (by PCR, viral culture, or influenza A serology)
- Non-H5 Influenza Strain
- Other etiology*
- Did not meet case definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Entered by CDC:</th>
<th>Contact Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>m m d d y y y y</td>
<td>m m d d y y y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Name of CDC Contact:**

**Alternative Diagnosis**

- A. Was an alternative non-influenza respiratory pathogen detected?  □ Yes*  □ No  □ Unknown
  
  **If yes** specify:

- B. Was there a diagnosis other than respiratory infection?  □ Yes*  □ No  □ Unknown
  
  **If yes** specify:
Appendix E1: Public Health Ordered Isolation Letter to Suspected and Confirmed Novel Influenza Cases

Patient name
Street Address
City, WY Zip code

Date of Order

Dear [Patient name]:

You were recently diagnosed with an infection of a novel (pandemic) strain of influenza. Because this strain of influenza is very contagious to others, strong measures must be taken to stop further spread of the disease and protect the public’s health. Therefore, under the authority vested in me pursuant to Wyoming State Statute § 35-1-240, I hereby order, for the protection of the public health, that you, [patient name], of [patient address], [city/town], remain under public health ordered isolation until this order is lifted by public health officials. This will typically be until 7 days after illness began, or until recovered, whichever is later. (the actual length of isolation will be determined during an actual pandemic based on epidemiologic data and guidance from the CDC).

If your symptoms have not improved after 7 days, you may need to follow these guidelines for a longer time. Your healthcare provider and/or public health officials will tell you if you need to follow this order for longer than 7 days.

If your symptoms worsen, please call your healthcare provider or local public health. The local Public Health Nursing office will be calling your home on a daily basis to check to see if anyone in your family or household is getting sick. If someone you live with or spend time with gets sick with fever or develops other flu-like symptoms (e.g. cough, headache, muscle aches), call that person’s healthcare provider, and also call your local public health office at (local number) or the Wyoming Department of Health at (877) 996-9000.

1. **Stay at home.**
   You may leave your home only if you remain on your property and have no face-to-face contact with anyone other than members of your household.

   You may not leave your property during this isolation period for any reason, except to visit your healthcare provider or for a medical emergency. Do not go to work, school, or any other public areas. If you need something from outside your home, ask family, friends, and neighbors who are not sick to get it for you.

2. **Use safe practices to protect the health of others.**
   Wearing a surgical mask when you are around other people may help lessen the chance you will spread your illness to others. You may be provided a surgical mask(s) to take with you by your healthcare provider or local public health officials, depending on supplies. In addition, surgical masks can usually be purchased at drug stores or medical supply stores. If you must purchase your own masks please have a family member or friend who is not ill make the purchase for you.

   Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue when you sneeze, cough, or blow your nose. Put the used tissue in the garbage and remember to wash your hands immediately afterwards.
While at home, limit your contact with those that live with you as much as possible. Consider designating one person as the primary caregiver. If possible, the primary caregiver should be someone who does not have an underlying medical condition that places them at high risk for severe illness. Sleep in a separate room, if possible, or at least in a separate bed. Avoid close contact such as kissing. Consider having caregivers wear a surgical mask or respirator (N95 mask) when in close contact with any ill person. Surgical masks and respirators (N95 masks) are usually available for purchase at pharmacies or home health supply stores, although supplies may be quite limited by the spread of influenza in your community.

**Only people who live in your home or who are essential for patient care or support should enter your home while this order is in place.** If non-ill persons must enter the home, they must use appropriate protective measures or avoid close contact with the patient.

Wash your hands often, for at least 15 seconds, with soap and warm water or alcohol-based hand rubs. Hand washing may be the best way to prevent others from getting sick. You should wash your hands after coughing, sneezing, blowing your nose, and going to the bathroom.

Throw out your used tissues and face masks with your regular garbage. Do not share eating utensils (spoons, forks, cups, or glasses), towels, or bedding (pillows, sheets, or blankets) with others. These items can be used again after routine cleaning with soap and hot water. Do not share toothbrushes, cigarettes and other tobacco products, or drinks.

If any of your respiratory fluids (secretions from your nose or mouth) get on surfaces in your home (such as door knobs or any other object that you sneeze or cough on), the surface should be washed with a household cleaner, such as bleach (1 part household bleach to 9 parts water) or other disinfectant. Anyone doing the cleaning should wear gloves.

3. **Call your healthcare provider if your symptoms worsen.**

If your symptoms worsen, please call your healthcare provider or local public health.

If you need to go to the doctor’s office, you should have a family member or friend drive you in a private car. Do not take public transportation (eg. bus). Contact your doctor before you visit and tell the doctor you have been diagnosed with pandemic influenza. Also notify the local public health office that you will be traveling to your healthcare provider. If you have one, wear a surgical face mask on the way to and from your healthcare provider. You should go straight to the receptionist when you arrive so they can put you in a private room. Try to sit away from others as much as possible.

If you are very sick and need to call an ambulance to take you to the hospital, let the operator know that you have pandemic influenza when you call 911, and let the ambulance crew know when they arrive.

Failure to follow these instructions will place the health of others at risk. Therefore, failure to comply with all directives in this order may result in the issuance of an emergency order requiring that you be taken into custody pursuant to Wyoming State Statute §§ 35-1-240, and 35-4-103 et seq. to ensure that you do not expose other persons to this dangerous and potentially deadly disease. If you have questions call your local public health office at (*list number*) or the Wyoming Department of Health at (877) 996-9000.

Sincerely,

[Signature of State Health Officer, or designee, or County Health Officer]
Appendix E2: Voluntary Isolation Letter for Novel Influenza Cases

Dear Patient:

You have recently been diagnosed with an infection with a novel strain of influenza. Although you may be feeling better and are being sent home from the hospital or clinic, others who are in close contact with you could still get the infection from you.

Because influenza is contagious, strong measures must be taken to stop further spread of the disease. As a result, you are directed to follow the following guidelines from now until 7 days after illness began, or until no longer ill (absence of fever, cough, runny nose, headache, muscle aches) whichever is later. (the actual length of isolation will be determined during an actual pandemic based on epidemiologic data and guidance from the CDC).

1. Stay at home.

You may leave your home only if you remain on your property and have no face-to-face contact with anyone other than members of your household.

You may not leave your property during this isolation period for any reason, except to visit your healthcare provider or for a medical emergency. Do not go to work, school, or any other public areas. If you need something from outside your home, ask family, friends, and neighbors who are not sick to get it for you.

Failure to follow these instructions will place the health of others at risk.

2. Use safe practices so your household members do not get sick.

Wearing a surgical mask when you are around other people may help lessen the chance you will spread your illness to others. You may be provided a surgical mask(s) to take with you by your healthcare provider or local public health officials, depending on supplies. In addition, surgical masks can usually be purchased at drug stores or medical supply stores. If you must purchase your own masks please have a family member or friend who is not ill make the purchase for you.

Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue when you sneeze, cough, or blow your nose. Put the used tissue in the garbage and remember to wash your hands immediately afterwards.

While at home, limit your contact with those that live with you as much as possible. Consider designating one person as the primary caregiver. If possible, the primary caregiver should be someone who does not have an underlying medical condition that places them at high risk for severe illness. Sleep in a separate room, if possible, or at least in a separate bed. Avoid close contact such as kissing. Consider having caregivers wear a surgical mask or respirator (N95 mask) when in close contact with the ill person. Surgical masks and respirators (N95 masks) are usually available for purchase at pharmacies or home health supply stores, although supplies will be quite limited during a pandemic.

Only people who live in your home or who are essential for patient care or support should enter your home while this order is in place. If non-ill persons must enter the home, they must use appropriate protective measures or avoid close contact with the patient.
Wash your hands for at least 15 seconds often with soap and warm water or alcohol-based hand rubs. Hand washing may be the best way to prevent others from getting sick. You should wash your hands after coughing, sneezing, blowing your nose, and going to the bathroom.

Throw out your used tissues and face masks with your regular garbage. Do not share eating utensils (spoons, forks, cups, or glasses), towels, or bedding (pillows, sheets, or blankets) with others. These items can be used again after routine cleaning with soap and hot water. Do not share toothbrushes, cigarettes and other tobacco products, or drinks.

If any of your respiratory fluids (secretions from your nose or mouth) get on surfaces in your home (such as door knobs or any other object that you sneeze or cough on), the surface should be washed with a household cleaner, such as bleach (1 part household bleach to 9 parts water) or other disinfectant. Anyone doing the cleaning should wear gloves.

3. Call your healthcare provider if your symptoms worsen.

If your symptoms worsen, please call your healthcare provider.

If you need to go to the doctor’s office, you should have a family member or friend drive you in a private car. Do not take public transportation (bus). Please contact your doctor before you visit and tell the doctor you have been diagnosed with pandemic influenza. If you have one, wear a surgical face mask on the way to see your healthcare provider. You should go straight to the receptionist when you arrive so they can put you in a private room. Try to sit away from others as much as possible.

If you are very sick and need to call an ambulance to take you to the hospital, let the operator know that you may have pandemic influenza when you call 911, and let the ambulance crew know when they arrive.

For more information, please call your healthcare provider or the Wyoming Department of Health at (877) 996-9000.

Sincerely,

Brent D. Sherard, MD
Wyoming State Health Officer
Appendix F: Quarantine Instructions for Contacts of Novel Influenza Cases

You have been identified as a close contact of an individual who has been diagnosed with, or suspected to have, novel influenza (pandemic influenza). Because influenza is contagious, strong measures must be taken to stop further spread of the disease. As a result, you are directed to comply with the following guidelines, from now until at least 7 days after you last had contact with the ill person. The exact time period for which you will be under quarantine will be determined by public health officials. *(The actual length of quarantine will be determined during an actual pandemic based on epidemiologic data and guidance from CDC).*

**Monitor your temperature**

Take your temperature twice a day for the time period determined by public health officials. Record your temperature in the table below. A representative from the local Public Health Nursing office will be calling your home on a daily basis to check to see if you have developed a fever or other respiratory symptoms.

**Temperature Monitoring Table for Novel Influenza Contacts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instructions:</th>
<th>Record your temperature twice each day for the time period determined by your healthcare provider in the boxes below.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If you develop a fever of 100° F or greater OR any respiratory symptoms (coughing, shorness of breath, etc), call your healthcare provider and the following number immediately:</td>
<td>(888) 996-9104.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Day 7</th>
<th>Day 8</th>
<th>Day 9</th>
<th>Day 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calendar Date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Temperature #1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For non-emergencies, or if you have questions, please call the Wyoming Department of Health at (877) 996-9000.

**Call your healthcare provider if you develop symptoms**

If you (or someone you live with or spend time with) gets sick with fever or respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness of breath, or difficulty breathing), please call your healthcare provider right away. Also, please call the Wyoming Department of Health at (888) 996-9104.

If you need to go to the doctor’s office, you should have a family member or friend drive you in a private car. Do not take public transportation (e.g. bus). Please contact your doctor before you visit and tell the doctor that you have been in contact with an individual who was diagnosed with avian influenza. You should go straight to the receptionist when you arrive so they can put you in a private room. Try to sit away from others as much as possible.

If you are very sick and need to call an ambulance to take you to the hospital, let the operator know that you may have avian influenza when you call 911, and let the ambulance crew know when they arrive.

For more information, please call your healthcare provider or the Wyoming Department of Health at (877) 996-9000.
Appendix G: Facilities Identified for Mass Immunization Clinics by County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Name of Location</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>MOU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>UW Arena Auditorium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Laramie</td>
<td></td>
<td>766-3306</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Horn</td>
<td>Greybull High Gym SD#3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greybull</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>Gillette Fire Stations</td>
<td>200 Rohan Avenue</td>
<td>Gillette</td>
<td></td>
<td>682-5319</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>445 West Swift Creek</td>
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<td>Church of Jesus Christ LDS</td>
<td>246 East 3rd Avenue</td>
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<td>McKell Allred</td>
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<td>LDS Stake Center</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Presbyteriang Church</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
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<td>734-0388</td>
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<td>Weston</td>
<td>Salt Creek Vet Clinic</td>
<td>5362 US Hwy 16</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>Dr. Pete Vorhapll</td>
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Appendix H: Influenza Doses Administered Form (in development)
Appendix I: HHS Vaccine Priority Group Recommendations*

*Taken from the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS) guidance on allocating and targeting pandemic influenza vaccine July 23, 2008. **ACTUAL PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS MAY DIFFER FOR SPECIFIC INFLUENZA STRAINS BASED ON EPIDEMIOLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS.**

Table 1. Vaccination target groups, estimated populations, and tiers for severe, moderate and less severe pandemics as defined by the Pandemic Severity Index (PSI). Persons in occupational groups not specifically targeted for vaccination in Moderate and Less Severe pandemics are targeted according to their age and health status in the general population.

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Estimated Number*</th>
<th>Severe</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Less severe</th>
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<td>Essential support &amp; sustainment personnel</td>
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<td>Intelligence services</td>
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<td>Border protection personnel</td>
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<td>National Guard personnel</td>
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<td>Other domestic national security personnel</td>
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<td>Health care providers in LTCFs</td>
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<td>(EMS, law enforcement and fire services)</td>
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<td>Healthy adults 19–64 yrs old</td>
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*Estimates rounded to closest 50,000. Occupational target group population sizes may change as plans are developed further for implementation of the pandemic vaccination program.

**Persons not targeted for vaccination in an occupational group would be vaccinated as part of the General Population based on their age and health status.
Appendix J: Antiviral Drug Priority Group Recommendations*

The use of antiviral medications in an influenza pandemic should be guided by the following list of priority group recommendations. These recommendations were developed taking into consideration the likely limited supply of antiviral medications, the fact that some groups of people are at higher risk of severe complications and death, and the need to maintain a community’s ability to provide essential services, such as healthcare. Use of antiviral medications will involve some members of all of these groups simultaneously.

Treatment

- Treatment of influenza patients admitted to the hospital.

- Treatment of highest-risk outpatients (immunocompromised persons and pregnant women). Specifically this includes persons with hematopoietic stem cell transplants and solid organ transplants; severe immunosuppression due to cancer therapy or hematological malignancy; immunosuppressive therapy for other illnesses (e.g., rheumatoid arthritis); HIV infection and a CD4 count <200; dialysis; and women who are in the second or third trimester of pregnancy.

- Treatment of increased risk outpatients (young children 12-23 months old, persons >65 yrs old, and persons with underlying medical conditions).

- Treatment of patients and prophylaxis of contacts in outbreak response in nursing homes and other residential settings.

- Treatment of other persons who present for care early during their illness and would benefit from antiviral medication treatment.

Prophylaxis

- Prophylaxis of critical healthcare workers, public health workers, emergency service personnel, and workers with unique roles maintaining critical infrastructure and services for whom there is inadequate back-up personnel to provide these services, for the duration of the community outbreak.

- Post exposure prophylaxis of highest risk outpatients (e.g. immunocompromised persons, pregnant women). See description of this group above.

*Adapted by the WDH from Part 1; Appendix D of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan.

Possible Model for Determining Antiviral Treatment and Prophylaxis Needs

Assumptions:
- Estimated 35% attack rate (according to CDC Flu-aid software this would represent a severe pandemic).
- Estimate that the number of persons with influenza whom will present for diagnosis and treatment in a timely enough manner for antiviral medications to be effective, or whom will be hospitalized and therefore candidates for treatment, will total approximately 50% to 75% of flu cases. /Local healthcare triage plans
should have the goal of instructing mildly ill persons to stay home, and directing those with more severe illness or those persons in an antiviral treatment priority group to the appropriate level of care."

- Local pandemic influenza planners will likely have a strategy of antiviral prophylaxis for persons in the U.S. Health and Human Services Antiviral Use Priority Groups (Appendix D) and the Wyoming Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Response Plan Antiviral Priority Groups (Appendix I). The number of persons in these groups will be county specific, and will be dependent on the numbers of persons in each county that belong to these groups and local emergency plans regarding issues such as healthcare surge capacity. Prophylaxis for these groups should be expected to require at least 4-6 courses of antiviral medications (40 - 60 days). As such, use of antiviral medications for long-term prophylaxis should be judicious, and put in place only when there exists the high likelihood of widespread transmission within a community.

Possible Model:
0.35 x county population = X (estimated number of ill persons in county)

X / 2 = Y (estimated number of persons with influenza whom will present for diagnosis and treatment in a timely enough manner for antiviral medications to be effective, or whom will be hospitalized and therefore candidates for treatment. This example uses 50% estimate, but could perhaps be up to 75%)

Z = number of persons for which long term prophylaxis may be indicated based on local planning and prioritization

Z x 6 = P (number of courses of antiviral medication needed for 60 days of prophylaxis)

The sum of Y and P will have to come out of the county’s total allotment of antiviral medications from the SNS and State stockpiles. Local planners will have to look at these estimated needs and balance the two areas of need.

Example calculation (using Campbell County for illustration purposes):
0.35 x 37,405 = 13,092 (estimated number of ill persons in county)
13,092 / 2 = 6546 (estimated persons whom will be candidates for treatment. This example uses 50% estimate, but could perhaps be up to 75%)
Campbell County allotment = 9,174 courses
9,174 - 6546 = 2628 courses available for long term prophylaxis
2628 / 6 = 438 persons whom can be prophylaxed for 60 days
Appendix K: Guidelines for Healthcare Facilities Management

These guidelines were created to help health care facilities maximize staffed beds, maximize resources available, and decrease disease transmission within the facility during an influenza pandemic.

**Staffing:** One of the greatest challenges in a pandemic response is expected to be the management of high patient load in the face of reduced staff. Many hospitals already have high census protocols and emergency preparedness plans that may be adapted to pandemic planning. Specific preventive interventions may reduce staff absenteeism during a pandemic. Health care personnel are among priority groups for antiviral chemoprophylaxis and vaccination. However, available supply of antivirals likely will be far less than the need and the efficacy of chemoprophylaxis may be compromised by antiviral resistance. If available, vaccine is also likely to be in short supply early in a pandemic. Assuming insufficient vaccine initially to protect all hospital staff, health departments and health care organizations should work together to define front-line health care workers who would have priority for vaccination or chemoprophylaxis. Absenteeism may result from illness, the need to care for ill family members, and possibly from fear of exposure and infection. As part of preparedness planning, health care organizations should develop strategies to cope with staffing shortages.

Strategies to increase available staff:

1. Ensure that the facility’s time-off policies and procedures adequately consider staffing needs in periods of clinical crisis.
2. Consider or expand hospital-sponsored sick care services for the children of hospital staff to reduce staff absenteeism.
3. Within reasonable limits of clinical competency, consider use of registered nurses and other health care providers serving in administrative positions to provide patient care.
4. Consider appropriate clinical care roles for trainees (such as medical or nursing students), retired health care providers, and community volunteers for some patient care roles and other functions such as patient or specimen transport and for maintaining good patient flow in crowded emergency department settings.
5. When vaccine becomes available, sponsor local immunization programs for all staff members, physicians and their families, and other at-risk members of the community.
6. Preferentially use immunized staff to care for those with suspected or confirmed influenza infection.
7. Generally, health care workers who have respiratory illness should be excluded from work to avoid infection of patients, many of whom are at high risk for severe or complicated disease. In a pandemic, and faced with critical staff shortages, such restrictions could be relaxed on a case-by-case
basis, such that health care workers who have mild respiratory illness could provide care for 
cohorted influenza patients.

8. In addition to chemoprophylaxis begun before exposure and vaccination, other strategies to decrease 
the risk that a health care worker will be infected include good infection control and post-exposure 
chemoprophylaxis. Antiviral treatment using a neuraminidase inhibitor shortly after onset of 
symptoms can decrease the duration of illness and time missed from work as well as reducing the 
amount of viral shedding and risk to other staff and patients. Early therapy also is the most efficient 
approach to antiviral use when supplies are limited.

Triage:

During the peak of a pandemic, hospital emergency departments and outpatient offices might be 
overwhelmed with patients seeking care. Therefore, triage should be conducted to: 1) identify persons who 
might have pandemic influenza, 2) separate them from others to reduce the risk of disease transmission, and 
3) identify the type of care they require (i.e., home care or hospitalization).

- Develop a strategy for triage, diagnosis, and isolation of possible pandemic influenza patients.

  Consider the following triage mechanisms:
  - Using phone triage to identify patients who need emergency care and those who can be 
    referred to a medical office or other non-urgent facility
  - Assigning separate waiting areas for persons with respiratory symptoms
  - Assigning a separate triage evaluation area for persons with respiratory symptoms
  - Assigning a “triage coordinator” to manage patient flow, including deferring or referring 
    patients who do not require emergency care.

- Review procedures for the clinical evaluation of patients in the emergency department and in 
  outpatient medical offices to facilitate efficient and appropriate disposition of patients.

- Review admission procedures and streamline them as needed to limit the number of patient 
  encounters in the hospital (e.g., direct admission to an inpatient bed).

- Identify a “trigger” point at which screening for signs and symptoms of pandemic influenza in all 
  persons entering the hospital will escalate from passive (e.g., signs at the entrance) to active (e.g., 
  direct questioning). In addition to visual alerts, potential screening measures might include priority 
  triage of persons with respiratory symptoms and telephone screening of patients with appointments.

- Given the large number of people in a community ill with influenza, local healthcare triage plans 
  may need to give consideration to instructing mildly ill persons to stay home, and directing those 
  with more severe illness or those persons in an antiviral treatment priority group (see Appendix I) to 
  the appropriate level of care. Such a strategy will focus antiviral medications on individuals likely to
benefit the most, reduce the burden on an overwhelmed healthcare system, and limit the number of persons exposed to individuals with influenza.

**Facility access:** Hospitals should determine in advance the criteria and procedures they will use to limit access to the facility if pandemic influenza spreads through the community.

- Define “essential” and “non-essential” visitors with regard to the hospital and the population served. Develop protocols for limiting non-essential visitors.
- Develop criteria or “triggers” for temporary closing of the hospital to new admissions and transfers. The criteria should consider staffing ratios, isolation capacity, and risks to non-influenza patients. As part of this effort, hospital administrators should: 1) determine who will make decisions about temporary closings and how and to whom these decisions will be communicated, and 2) consult with state and local health departments on their roles in determining policies for hospital admissions and transfers.
- Determine how to involve hospital security services in enforcing access controls. Consider meeting with local law enforcement officials in advance to determine what assistance, if any, they can provide. Note that local law enforcement might be overburdened during a pandemic and have limited ability to assist healthcare facilities with security services.

**Bed Availability:** Additional beds can be made available for those who require admission for influenza or its complications by decreasing other admissions, implementing more stringent triage and decreasing the length-of-stay. Hospitals also may be able to add acute care beds in a public health emergency, although staffing those beds may be a limitation.

Strategies to increase the availability of hospital beds:

1. Review policies for scheduling elective procedures and develop guidelines and contingency plans to limit elective admissions and surgery. Decreasing elective utilization of health care facilities during a pandemic will increase bed availability, allow redistribution of staff and equipment, and may decrease the elective patient’s exposure to influenza infected persons. Consideration should be given to performing any necessary surgeries in a surgical ambulatory care center to reduce the likelihood of exposure to influenza infected patients in hospital.

2. Consider appointment of a triage officer to manage patient flow in the emergency department, including appropriate patient referral to other clinics within the facility or to local physicians’ offices or nontraditional care settings when emergency department care is not required.
3. Review and revise criteria for admission. Consider directing patients referred for admission by their physician to the emergency department where the need for admission can be directly evaluated (by a triage officer) in the context of bed and staff shortages.

4. Review guidelines and policies allowing expeditious transfer of patients between units, especially from critical care units, when indicated.

5. Develop plans and policies to promptly transport discharged patients home or to other facilities. Consider creating a patient discharge holding area or discharge lounge to free up bed space.

6. Ensure that the facility has effective rules for expediting patient discharge during periods of anticipated high demand. These rules might include allocation of a sufficient number of triage physicians and nurses to the appropriate services and procedures for discharge and transfer of patients to home, a skilled nursing facility, or other facilities.

7. Coordinate with home health care agencies to provide follow-up for persons who are not admitted to the hospital or are discharged earlier than usual.

**Equipment/Supplies:** Plan for the limited availability and increased need for equipment and supplies such as respirators, gurneys and supply carts within the facility and for potential disruption in the normal delivery of supplies and repair services. Although several thousand ventilators are included in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), this quantity is small relative to what the national need may be. Because a pandemic may not affect all areas simultaneously, it may be possible to shift some resources between areas; this may be most feasible if a pandemic wave already has passed through a community and ventilators become available rather than an area that has not yet experienced disease sending its equipment elsewhere.

Consumable resource needs are those specific to an outbreak of infectious respiratory disease, including hand hygiene supplies, gowns, gloves, and surgical and N-95 masks, as well as other supplies associated with routine patient care. Since these types of supplies have no expiration, it would be possible to establish stockpiles (either in individual facilities or regionally). Healthcare facilities should be expected to provide supplies, including masks, to their patients and staff to ensure appropriate infection control within their facility as appropriate based on infection control guidelines and supply availability. Local public health officials may wish to provide assistance to healthcare facilities in the form of supplies or funding based on need to ensure proper infection control within those facilities. It is quite likely during a pandemic availability of essential supplies will be limited. Healthcare providers and facilities are encouraged to procure essential supplies, including respiratory protection for patients and staff, before a pandemic occurs.

In the event of a pandemic, local healthcare facilities will be the primary entity responsible for the care and treatment of ill persons. It is recommended that healthcare facilities maintain a supply of antiviral...
medications to be used for the treatment of ill persons, as the availability of such medications allows. Current evidence indicates the facility supply should include oseltamivir (Tamiflu); however the facility supply does not necessarily need to be restricted to oseltamivir as other antiviral medications such as zanamivir (Relenza) may be effective against pandemic virus strains. In addition, at this time the antiviral medication available for public health stockpiles does NOT include suspension formulations for pediatric dosing, so healthcare facilities and pharmacies should consider this need. While it is possible that public health stockpiles of antiviral medications may be available, relying solely on public health stockpiles would likely not provide sufficient amounts of antiviral medications and would not be the most efficient means of providing treatment to patients.

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) ventilator policy - Wyoming is projected to receive 7 ventilators from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The following policy has been developed by the Wyoming Department of Health (WDH) for distribution of these limited ventilators.

1. Requests from county Emergency Operations Center (EOCs), hospitals or public health must go to the WDH SNS Coordinator through the county EOC.
2. The SNS Coordinator will gather data on the number of requests received and the number of ventilators available.
3. SNS Coordinator will work with the WDH Hospital Preparedness Program Coordinator (HPPC) to:
   a. Confirm with hospital the need for the ventilator to include:
      i. are all available ventilators in use
      ii. does the hospital have critical patients in need of the ventilator now
      iii. does the hospital have respiratory therapy staff to adequately operate the requested ventilators
4. The SNS Coordinator will discuss the request and above information with the WDH Incident Commander and Operations Chief
5. In general the request for ventilators will be filled in the order they are received with the following caveats:
   a. There must be a demonstrated need
   b. If multiple facilities are requesting ventilators, each facility may not get the number they request. WDH will try to spread the ventilators out so each requesting facility can have at least one (until supplies are exhausted, by order of request).
   c. If the entire allotment of SNS ventilators are requested by only a small number of facilities the HPPC may be directed to do a needs assessment to determine needs of other facilities.
**Infection Control:** Influenza viruses are spread from person-to-person, primarily through inhalation of small particle aerosols and large droplet infection. Influenza can be highly contagious, particularly among persons without pre-existing antibodies against influenza, such as young children during normal influenza seasons and anyone during a pandemic. The typical incubation period of influenza is two days (range one to four days). Viral shedding, and the period during which a person may be infectious to others, generally peaks on the second day of symptoms, but may begin the day before symptoms start, and typically lasts five to seven days in adults. Young children and immunocompromised persons may shed virus and be infectious for three weeks or longer. The amount of virus shed and the length of time of viral shedding may be prolonged during initial infection with a new influenza subtype.

Infection control practices for pandemic influenza are generally the same as for other human influenza viruses and primarily involve the application of standard and droplet precautions (see [http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation_ptII.html](http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_isolation_ptII.html) for description of infection control precautions). Special guidelines for infection control may need to be in place during pandemic influenza, taking into account the likelihood that a high proportion of the population will be affected and that secondary infections are a major source of morbidity and mortality.

At this time WDH recommends adherence to the following CDC recommended infection control precautions for pandemic influenza ([http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm)):

**WDH Recommended Infection Control Precautions for Healthcare Facilities for Novel Influenza Virus**

**Implementation of Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette**
To prevent the transmission of all respiratory infections in healthcare settings, including novel influenza virus, respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette infection control measures should be implemented at the first point of contact with a potentially infected person. They should be incorporated into infection control practices as one component of Standard Precautions. Healthcare facilities should establish mechanisms to screen patients for signs and symptoms of febrile respiratory illness at any point of entry to the facility. Provisions should be made to allow for prompt isolation and assessment of symptomatic patients.
Implementation of Facility Contingency Plans
Staff in healthcare settings should monitor information from state and local health departments, and CDC, for the latest information. Healthcare facilities should be reviewing and making plans to implement their facility contingency response and/or pandemic response plans. This should include making plans for managing increasing patient volume and potential staffing limitations.

Interim Infection Control Recommendations
If the patient is presenting in a community where novel influenza virus transmission is occurring (based upon information provided by state and local health departments), these infection control recommendations should apply to all patients with febrile respiratory illness (defined as fever [greater than 37.8° C] plus one or more of the following: rhinorrhea or nasal congestion; sore throat; cough).

If the patient is presenting in a community without novel influenza virus transmission, these infection control recommendations should apply to those patients with febrile respiratory illness AND:
- close contact with a person who is a confirmed, probable, or suspected case of novel influenza virus infection, within the past 7 days OR
- travel to a community either within the United States or internationally where there are one or more confirmed novel influenza virus cases within 7 days

As the situation evolves, the ability to use epidemiologic links to identify potentially infectious patients may be lost and these recommendations may need to be applied to all patients with febrile respiratory illness.

This situation will be monitored, and these guidelines will be updated as needed.

Infection Control of Ill Persons in a Healthcare Setting:
Patient placement and transport
Any patients who have a confirmed, probable, or suspected case of novel influenza virus and present for care at a healthcare facility should be placed directly into individual rooms and the door should be kept closed, whenever feasible. Healthcare personnel who interact with the patients should follow the infection control guidance in this document. For the purposes of this guidance, healthcare personnel are defined as persons, including employees, students, contractors, attending clinicians, and volunteers, whose activities involve contact with patients in a healthcare or laboratory setting.

For procedures that are likely to generate aerosols (e.g., bronchoscopy, elective intubation, suctioning, administering nebulized medications), an airborne infection isolation room (AIIR) with negative pressure air handling with 6 to 12 air changes per hour can be used. Air can be exhausted directly outside or be recirculated after filtration by a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter.
Procedures for transport of patients in isolation precautions should be followed. Facilities should also ensure that plans are in place to communicate information about suspected cases that are transferred to other departments in the facility (e.g., radiology, laboratory) and other facilities. The **ill person should wear a surgical mask to contain secretions when outside of the patient room** and should be encouraged to perform hand hygiene frequently and follow respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette practices.

**Isolation precautions**

All healthcare personnel who enter the patient’s room should take standard and contact precautions.

Maintain adherence to hand hygiene by washing with soap and water or using alcohol-based hand sanitizer immediately after removing gloves and other equipment and after any contact with respiratory secretions. Nonsterile gloves and gowns along with eye protection should be donned when entering a patient’s room.

**Respiratory protection:** All healthcare personnel who enter the rooms of patients in isolation with confirmed, suspected, or probable novel influenza virus should wear a fit-tested disposable N95 respirator or better. Respiratory protection should be donned when entering a patient’s room.

Note that this recommendation differs from current infection control guidance for seasonal influenza, which recommends that healthcare personnel wear surgical masks for patient care. The rationale for the use of respiratory protection is that a more conservative approach is needed until more is known about the specific transmission characteristics of this new virus.

**Management of visitors**

Limit visitors for patients in isolation for novel influenza virus infection to persons who are necessary for the patient's emotional well-being and care. Visitors who have been in contact with the patient before and during hospitalization are a possible source of novel influenza virus. Therefore, schedule and control visits to allow for appropriate screening for acute respiratory illness before entering the hospital and appropriate instruction on use of personal protective equipment and other precautions (e.g., hand hygiene, limiting surfaces touched) while in the patient's room. Visitors should be instructed to limit their movement within the facility.

Visitors may be offered a gown, gloves, eye protection, and respiratory protection (i.e., N95 respirator) and should be instructed by healthcare personnel on their use before entering the patient’s room.

**Duration of precautions**

Isolation precautions should be continued for 7 days from symptom onset or until the resolution of symptoms, whichever is longer.
Persons with novel influenza virus infection should be considered potentially contagious from one day before to 7 days following illness onset. Persons who continue to be ill longer than 7 days after illness onset should be considered potentially contagious until symptoms have resolved. Children, especially younger children, might be contagious for longer periods.

**Surveillance of healthcare personnel**

In communities where novel influenza virus transmission is occurring, healthcare personnel should be monitored daily for signs and symptoms of febrile respiratory illness. Healthcare personnel who develop these symptoms should be instructed not to report to work, or if at work, should cease patient care activities and notify their supervisor and infection control personnel.

In communities without novel influenza virus transmission, healthcare personnel working in areas of a facility where there are patients being assessed or isolated for novel influenza virus infection should be monitored daily for signs and symptoms of febrile respiratory infection. This would include healthcare personnel exposed to patients in an outpatient setting or the emergency department. Healthcare personnel who develop these symptoms should be instructed not to report to work, or if at work, should cease patient care activities and notify their supervisor and infection control personnel.

**Management of ill healthcare personnel**

Healthcare personnel should not report to work if they have a febrile respiratory illness.

In communities where novel influenza virus transmission is occurring, healthcare personnel who develop a febrile respiratory illness should be excluded from work for 7 days or until symptoms have resolved, whichever is longer.

In communities without novel influenza virus transmission, healthcare personnel who develop a febrile respiratory illness and have been working in areas of the hospital where swine influenza patients are present, should be excluded from work for 7 days or until symptoms have resolved, whichever is longer.

In communities where novel influenza transmission is not occurring, healthcare personnel who develop febrile respiratory illness and have not been in areas of the facility where swine influenza patients are present should follow facility guidelines on returning to work.

**Stewardship of personal protective equipment and antivirals**

Facilities should implement plans to ensure appropriate allocation of personal protective equipment, including N95 respirators, and antiviral medications.
Environmental infection control
Routine cleaning and disinfection strategies used during influenza seasons can be applied to the environmental management of swine influenza. Management of laundry, utensils and medical waste should also be performed in accordance with procedures followed for seasonal influenza.

Facility access control
Facilities should have signage at entry points instructing patients and visitors about hospital policies, including the need to notify staff immediately if they have signs and symptoms of febrile respiratory illness. Facilities in communities where swine influenza transmission is occurring should limit points of entry to the facility.

*Respirator use should be in the context of a complete respiratory protection program in accordance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. Staff should be medically cleared, fit-tested, and trained for respirator use, including: proper fit-testing and use of respirators, safe removal and disposal, and medical contraindications to respirator use."
Adapted from:
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm
Appendix L: Individual and Family Preparedness*

The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has developed guidelines to follow in preparation for a pandemic. You can prepare for an influenza pandemic now. You should know both the magnitude of what can happen during a pandemic outbreak and what actions you can take to help lessen the impact of an influenza pandemic on you and your family. This checklist will help you gather the information and resources you may need in case of a flu pandemic.

1. To plan for a pandemic:

   • Store a two week supply of water and food. During a pandemic, if you cannot get to a store, or if stores are out of supplies, it will be important for you to have extra supplies on hand. This can be useful in other types of emergencies, such as power outages and disasters.

   • Periodically check your regular prescription drugs to ensure a continuous supply in your home.

   • Have nonprescription drugs and other health supplies on hand, including pain relievers, stomach remedies, cough and cold medicines, fluids with electrolytes, vitamins, and disposable tissues. You may wish to have a supply of disposable surgical masks and respirators on hand. These can usually be purchased from pharmacies or home health supply stores.

   • Talk with family members and loved ones about how they would be cared for if they got sick, or what will be needed to care for them in your home.

   • Volunteer with local groups to prepare and assist with emergency response.

   • Get involved in your community as it works to prepare for an influenza pandemic.

2. To limit the spread of germs and prevent infection:
- Teach your children to wash hands frequently with soap and water, and model the current behavior.

- Teach your children to cover coughs and sneezes with tissues, and be sure to model that behavior.

- Teach your children to stay away from others as much as possible if they are sick. Stay home from work and school if sick.

3. Items to have on hand for an extended stay at home:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of food and non-perishables</th>
<th>Examples of medical, health, and emergency supplies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>□ Ready-to-eat canned meats, fish, fruits, vegetables, beans, and soups</td>
<td>□ Prescribed medical supplies such as glucose and blood-pressure monitoring equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Protein or fruit bars</td>
<td>□ Soap and water, or alcohol-based (60-95%) hand wash</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Dry cereal or granola</td>
<td>□ Medicines for fever, such as acetaminophen or ibuprofen</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Peanut butter or nuts</td>
<td>□ Thermometer</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Dried fruit</td>
<td>□ Anti-diarrheal medication</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Crackers</td>
<td>□ Vitamins</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Canned juices</td>
<td>□ Fluids with electrolytes</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Bottled water</td>
<td>□ Cleansing agent/soap</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Canned or jarred baby food and formula</td>
<td>□ Flashlight</td>
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<td>□ Pet food</td>
<td>□ Batteries</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Other nonperishable foods</td>
<td>□ Portable radio</td>
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<td></td>
<td>□ Manual can opener</td>
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<td></td>
<td>□ Garbage bags</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Tissues, toilet paper, disposable diapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>□ Consider disposable surgical masks and respirators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How to Protect Yourself and Others From Pandemic Influenza

- **Persons who have a flu-like illness must stay home and limit contact with others as much as possible.** A flu-like illness may consist of fever, chills, cough, sore throat, runny nose, headache, and muscle aches. All or only a few of the symptoms may be present. The affected person should stay home beginning at the first signs of illness and for 5 days after illness begins, or until recovered, whichever is later. If it is felt the person needs medical attention, they should call ahead to their healthcare provider or healthcare facility for instructions before leaving.

- **Avoid being around others who are ill as much as possible.** If your occupation requires you to be around ill people, your place of employment should have infection control measures in place to help lessen your chances of becoming ill.

- **Avoid large gatherings of people.** These may include but are not limited to business conferences, social organizations, sporting events, public meetings, and celebrations.

- **Everyone must practice good hand and respiratory hygiene.** This is important for both ill and well people. Good hygiene consists of washing hands frequently (soap and water or alcohol-based hand sanitizers), especially after touching items that may be contaminated with respiratory secretions; covering the nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing; using tissues to contain respiratory secretions, and disposing of tissues properly.

- **Mask and respirator use in non-healthcare settings during a pandemic** - The benefit of wearing masks by well persons in public settings has not been established. Mask and respirator use may somewhat decrease, but will not eliminate, the chance of becoming infected, and use is not a substitute for social distancing or other personal protection measures. The first and most important steps in reducing one’s risk of pandemic influenza are to limit close contact with others as much as possible and to practice good hygiene. These measures should be used at all times, regardless of whether a facemask or respirator is worn.

Individuals considering surgical mask or respirator use must consider that improper use may actually increase the transmission of illness to themselves or others. In addition, surgical mask and respirator use by an untrained person can be uncomfortable, stressful, and has the real potential to exacerbate underlying chronic respiratory or heart conditions. In addition, the supply of masks and respirators available to the public may not be enough to allow stockpiling by everyone. For
persons who make the individual choice to include mask or respirator use in their protection strategies, masks and respirators are usually available for purchase at pharmacies or medical supply stores.

Persons in non-healthcare or non-emergency medical services settings, for example the general public where close, direct contact with persons known or strongly suspected to have the pandemic influenza strain is not expected, may wish to consider mask or respirator use in the following situations:

1. When there is evidence of significant spread of pandemic influenza in a person's community, a facemask (eg. surgical mask, procedure mask, isolation mask) could be used if entry into a crowded setting that lacks protective measures is unavoidable (e.g., mass transit or going to a crowded store to purchase essentials such as medications).

2. When it is necessary to have close contact (less than 6 feet) with someone who is ill with pandemic influenza – for example, to give care to a family member – one should use an N95 respirator or equivalent certified by the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) and consider specifically using a respirator model that also is cleared by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for use by the general public in public health medical emergencies. Although fit testing programs generally are not available for the public, selecting an appropriate respirator, carefully following instructions for its use, and making sure that it fits tightly against the face are critical to ensuring the respirator provides protection. Because the material used to make respirators is denser than that used in facemasks, it may be more difficult to breathe through a respirator. Persons who have heart or lung disease or other illnesses that affect their breathing should consult a healthcare provider before using a respirator.

3. Ill persons should use a facemask when they must be in close contact with others. Examples of such contact include when the ill person is being cared for at home or if they need to leave home to access medical care or manage other necessities.

Given the potential for the above scenarios to occur in a pandemic, it would be reasonable for each household to stockpile some facemasks and respirators. The purchase of masks and respirators to be used according to the above scenarios is an individual responsibility. Government supplies of masks and respirators will NOT be available to meet these needs.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has made recommendations to aid families and individuals in making decisions about using masks or respirators (Interim Guidance on the Use and Purchase of Facemasks and Respirators by Individuals and Families for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, [http://aspe.hhs.gov/panflu/facemasks.html](http://aspe.hhs.gov/panflu/facemasks.html)). With proper precautions, a single caregiver can use the same respirator several times over a day for brief care visits with the same ill person in the household, so a stockpile of 20 respirators per household would be reasonable. Decisions on stockpiling facemasks and the number to obtain would depend on a family’s situation and their expectation of the need for close contact in crowded settings during a pandemic. When worn, the outside of the facemask or respirator may become contaminated with secretions from an ill person; therefore care should be taken to keep the facemask or respirator away from others after use and to wash hands well after removing a facemask or respirator, or before putting on a previously used facemask or respirator. Never wash or disinfect disposable facemasks or respirators and never share used facemasks or respirators with others.

Several scientific studies currently are being done to investigate the level of protection against influenza that may be provided by respirators and facemasks and the ability of persons to correctly and consistently use these devices. This interim guidance may be modified based on the results from these studies.

In addition, Federal OSHA has published *Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for an Influenza Pandemic (OSHA 3327-02N 2007)* which discusses measures which can be taken in the workplace to reduce the exposure of workers to the pandemic influenza virus, including mask and respirator use.

General information on buying and wearing facemasks and respirators can be found at the FDA website [http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ppe/masksrespirators.html](http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ppe/masksrespirators.html).

- **If a household member is ill with the flu there are steps you can take to decrease the chance other household members will get sick.** Everyone in the household must practice good respiratory hygiene (see above); physically separate the ill person from non-ill persons as much as possible; avoid sharing personal items (examples include bedding, towels, eating and drinking utensils, clothing, hygiene items, and anything else that may be contaminated with mouth or nasal secretions). It is OK to wash dishes and clothing of
ill persons with well persons using hot water and soap. Make sure to wash hands well after handling such items; limit the number of people providing care to the ill person, or having other close contact; if possible, the primary caregiver should be someone who does not have an underlying medical condition that places them at high risk for severe illness; if you have them available, consideration should be given to having the ill person wear a surgical mask when around others, and having caregivers wear a respirator (N95 mask) when in close contact with the ill person (see above recommendations). Surgical masks and respirators (N95 masks) are usually available for purchase at pharmacies or home health supply stores, although supplies will be quite limited during a pandemic. Wearing a mask must not take the place of good respiratory hygiene. All persons in the household must wash their hands frequently, especially after touching items that may have been contaminated with mouth or nasal secretions from others. You may wish to wear disposable gloves when handling materials contaminated with mouth or nasal secretions of others. You must still wash your hands thoroughly after removing the gloves. Special attention should be given to disinfecting items around the house that are frequently touched by others, such as doorknobs, light switches, toys, countertops, office supplies, etc.

- If the unfortunate circumstance should arise where the death of a family member occurs in your home, you should isolate the body in an area where it will not be touched or disturbed. If the body must be moved or otherwise touched you should wear gloves and avoid contacting oral and respiratory secretions (from mouth, eyes, nose). Wash hands thoroughly after touching the body or surfaces contaminated by secretions. Thoroughly disinfect surfaces and launder clothing that may have been contaminated by secretions. Call the appropriate authorities to report the death.

In addition to these general precautions, public health officials may announce additional control measures such as cancelling events, closing large gatherings of people, or requesting that well persons in positions that are not critical to the public’s health, safety, or general well-being stay home. It is important for your well being and the well being of others that you listen for and heed public health messages.
5. Home Care for Influenza

- A person suffering from flu should have rest and plenty of liquids, and should refrain from alcohol and tobacco. Medications to relieve flu symptoms are available over-the-counter and may offer some relief. In some cases, a health-care professional may prescribe antiviral drugs to treat the flu. Antibiotics (like penicillin) don’t cure it.

- Monitor flu symptoms by keeping a care log. Write down the date, time, fever, symptoms, medicines given and dosage. Make a new entry at least every 4 hours when awake or when the symptoms change.

- Call your healthcare professional if the ill person develops any of the following [Local healthcare systems and providers may establish “hotlines” or other information lines for citizens to call with flu related questions. These numbers may differ from the usual numbers people call. Please watch for messages from local public health officials or the local healthcare system for guidance on where to call for information]:
  - A high fever
  - Children and Adults: Greater than 105°F (40.5°C)
  - Babies 3- to 24-months-old: 103°F (39.4°C) or higher.
  - Babies up to 3 months: Rectal temperature of 100.4°F (38°C) or higher.
  - Shaking chills
  - Coughing that produces thick mucus
  - Dehydration (feeling of dry mouth or excessive thirst)
  - Worsening of an existing serious medical condition (for example: heart or lung disease, diabetes, HIV, cancer)

- If you cannot reach your health-care professional, call 9-1-1 or local emergency number for any of the signs below:
  - Irritability and/or confusion
  - Difficult breathing or chest pain with each breath
- Bluish skin
- Stiff neck
- Inability to move an arm or leg
- First-time seizure

- Prevent Dehydration. Dehydration occurs when the body loses too much water and it’s not replaced quickly enough. It can be serious. Begin giving soothing drinks at the first signs of the flu and follow these tips:
  - In addition to plenty of liquids, give ice and light, easily digested foods, such as soup and broth.
  - If the ill person has diarrhea or vomiting, give fluids that contain electrolytes. These are available at your pharmacy or grocery store. Or you can make your own rehydration electrolyte drink for someone 12 years or older (see below for recipe).
  - If drinking liquids makes nausea or vomiting worse, give one sip at a time until the ill person can drink again.

- **Electrolyte Drink (to be given to those 12 years or older only)**: 1 quart water 1/2 tsp. baking soda 1/2 tsp. table salt 3 to 4 tbsp. sugar 1/4 tsp. salt substitute Mix well and flavor with lemon juice or sugar-free Kool-Aid

- **Fluids for Children younger than 12**: Commercially available oral replacement solutions (ORS) can be purchased at most grocery stores and pharmacies in the United States without a prescription. A few widely available brands include Pedialyte®, Infalyte®, and ReVital®, although generic brands are equally effective. Gelatin, tea, rice water, fruit juice and other beverages are not recommended for use as Oral replacement therapy in children with diarrhea. Parents should not try to prepare ORS recipes at home for infants because the formulas must be exact.

- ORS may be given at home to a child who is mildly dehydrated, refusing to eat a normal diet, or has vomiting and/or diarrhea. If needed, ORS can be given in frequent, small
amounts by spoon, bottle, or cup over three to four hours. A pediatrician may provide specific instructions for oral rehydration to their patients. One method is described below:

- Parents should first measure out the total amount to be given with a standardized medicine syringe or measuring cup or spoon, rather than a regular cup or spoon.

- A total volume of 5 teaspoons per pound, or 50 milliliters per kilogram, should be given. For a 20-pound child, this would equal 100 teaspoons; for a 9 kg child, this would equal 450 milliliters.

- The fluid can be given by teaspoonfuls (approximately equal to 5 milliliters each) every one to two minutes or as tolerated.

- After the total amount has been given, a normal diet can be resumed.

- A child who refuse to drink or vomits immediately after drinking ORT should be monitored closely for worsening dehydration. Children who are not dehydrated may drink ORT after every episode of vomiting to prevent dehydration.

- Reduce Fever. To help reduce a fever, do the following:
  - Give plenty of fluids.
  - Give fever-reducing medication, such as acetaminophen or ibuprofen, as directed on the container’s label. Aspirin is also a fever-reducing medication but do not give aspirin to anyone younger than 20.
  - Keep a record of the ill person’s temperature in your care log.
  - To relieve discomfort, give a sponge bath with lukewarm water.

- **When is professional medical help needed?** See the previous section labeled “Call your healthcare professional if the ill person develops any of the following”. Health officials and providers in your community may have set up an information line you can call with questions about local access to healthcare. If so, it is important that you follow the directions given. When you arrive for medical care, tell the reception staff that you think the flu is
involved. You may be asked to wear a mask and/or sit in a separate area to protect others from getting sick.

- In children, emergency warning signs that need urgent medical attention include:
  o Fast breathing or trouble breathing
  o Bluish skin color
  o Not drinking enough fluids
  o Not waking up or not interacting
  o Being so irritable that the child does not want to be held
  o Flu-like symptoms improve but then return with fever and worse cough
  o Fever with a rash

- In adults, emergency warning signs that need urgent medical attention include:
  o Difficulty breathing or shortness of breath
  o Pain or pressure in the chest or abdomen
  o Sudden dizziness
  o Confusion
  o Severe or persistent vomiting

Where can I get more information?
For state information from the Wyoming Department of Health:
wyomingpandemicflu.org

For federal information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
pandemicflu.govHome Care
Appendix M: School Preparedness*

The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Department of Education have prepared checklists for schools to refer to in developing and/or preparing for a pandemic.

One possible control measure that could be recommended to help mitigate the effects of pandemic influenza on a community is the closing of schools, pre-schools, and daycares. While the closing of schools, pre-schools, and daycares may indeed eliminate a large gathering, such an action is not without potential complications and should not be entered into lightly. For these closures to be effective they must be implemented early in a pandemic (before widespread transmission) and be maintained throughout the entire time the pandemic virus is circulating in a community. This will likely be 1-2 months at a time for each pandemic wave, and possibly for 2 or 3 separate waves. Another complicating factor is that to be effective, these closures must NOT result in large gatherings of children, such as out-of-home childcare with multiple children or gathering at a popular spot such as a mall. Another concern about closing schools, pre-schools, and daycares is the potential adverse effect this may have on the ability of a community to provide essential services. Such closings have the significant potential to result in many adult workers having to stay home to care for children, and could result in lost income.

If the epidemiology suggests the pandemic is moderate or severe or that children are at particular risk of severe disease, then based upon guidance from public health officials consideration should be given by schools, pre-schools, and daycares to cancel services or classes in traditional classroom settings in an attempt to mitigate the disease impact in children.

It is possible, however, that WDH officials may recommend or even order the closure of schools, pre-schools, and daycares based on the epidemiology and transmission of the pandemic influenza strain. This may occur, for example, if the illness is believed to cause unusually severe disease in children. Public health officials, including the County Health
Officer and State Health Officer, have authority to order the closure of schools and other venues to protect public health (WY statute 35-1-240).

It is likely the decision whether or not to close schools, pre-schools, and daycares will be largely made by local school and public health officials, and parents. Such a decision will be dependent upon the school’s contingency plans for closure, anticipated effect on the community, extent of illness in the community, number of healthy staff and students, and parent’s willingness to send their children to these facilities.

Every school district should anticipate the possibility of closing traditional classroom settings during a pandemic and have contingency plans in place. These plans must be actively communicated to the parents and the community.

Colleges and universities should anticipate the canceling/postponing of events that result in large gatherings such as sports and cultural events and large classes. Strong consideration should be given to closing dormitory type student housing if the pandemic is epidemiologically considered moderate or severe in an attempt to mitigate the disease impact in college students.

### Child Care and Preschool Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

1. Planning and coordination:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form a committee of staff members and parents to produce a plan for dealing with a flu pandemic. Include members from all different groups your program serves. Include parents who do not speak English who can help contact other non-English speakers in the community. Staff of very small programs might consider joining together with other similar programs for planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assign one person to identify reliable sources of information and watch for public health warnings about flu, school closings, and other actions taken to prevent the spread of flu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn who in your area has legal authority to close child care programs if there is a flu emergency.</td>
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</table>
Learn whether the local/state health departments and agencies that regulate child care have plans. Be sure your flu plan is in line with their plans. Tell them if you can help support your community's plan.

Identify all the ways a flu pandemic might affect your program and develop a plan of action. (For example, you might have problems with food service, transportation, or staffing.)

Encourage parents to have a "Plan B" for finding care for their children if the program is closed during a flu pandemic. Give them ideas about where they might seek help based on your knowledge of the local child care community.

Work with those in charge of your community's plan to find other sources of meals for low-income children who receive subsidized meals while in your care. (For example, locate food pantries and meals on wheels.)

Learn about services in your area that can help your staff, children, and their families deal with stress and other problems caused by a flu pandemic.

Stage a drill to test your plan and then improve it as needed. Repeat the drill from time to time. Consider volunteering to help in tests of community plans.

Talk to other child care and preschool programs in your area to share information that could make your plan better. Discuss ways programs could work together to produce a stronger plan and pool resources.

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<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan how you would deal with program closings, staff absences, and gaps in student learning that could occur during a flu pandemic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plan ways to help families continue their child's learning if your child care program or preschool is closed. (For example, give parents things they can teach at home. Tell them how to find ideas on the internet. Talk with child care resource referral agencies or other groups that could help parents continue their children's learning at home.)</td>
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</table>
3. Infection control policies and actions:

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<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Give special attention to teaching staff, children, and their parents on how to limit the spread of infection. (For example, use good hand washing; cover the mouth when coughing or sneezing; clean toys frequently.) Programs should already be teaching these things to build habits that protect children from disease.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep a good supply of things you will need to help control the spread of infection. (For example, keep on hand plenty of soap, paper towels, and tissues.) Store the supplies in easy-to-find places.</td>
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<td>Tell families that experts recommend yearly flu shots for all children 6 months to 5 years old and for anyone who cares of children in that age range.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage staff to get flu shots each year.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tell parents to let your program know if their children are sick. Keep accurate records of when children or staff are absent. Include a record of the kind of illness that caused the absence (e.g., diarrhea/vomiting, coughing/breathing problems, rash, or other).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teach staff a standard set of steps for checking children and adults each day as they arrive to see if they are sick. Make it clear that any child or adult who is ill will not be admitted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have a plan for keeping children who become sick at your program away from other children until the family arrives, such as a fixed place for a sick room.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require staff members to stay home if they think they might be sick. If they become sick while at the program, require them to go home and stay home. Give staff paid sick leave so they can stay home without losing wages.</td>
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</table>
4. Communications planning:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have a plan for keeping in touch with staff members and students' families. Include several different methods of contacting them. (For example, you might use hotlines, telephone trees, text messaging, special Websites, local radio and/or TV stations.) Test the contact methods often to be sure they work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make sure staff and families have seen and understand your flu pandemic plan. Explain why you need to have a plan. Give them a chance to ask questions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Give staff and students' families reliable information on the issues listed below in their languages and at their reading levels.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| - How to help control the spread of flu by hand washing/cleansing and covering the mouth when coughing or sneezing. (See www.cdc.gov/flu/school/.)
- How to recognize a person that may have the flu, and what to do if they think they have the flu. (See www.pandemicflu.gov.)
- How to care for ill family members. (See www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup5.html#box4.)
- How to develop a family plan for dealing with a flu pandemic.(See www.pandemicflu.gov/planguage/) |
## School District (K-12) Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

1. Planning and coordination:

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<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify the authority responsible for declaring a public health emergency at the state and local levels and for officially activating the district's pandemic influenza response plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify for all stakeholders the legal authorities responsible for executing the community operational plan, especially those authorities responsible for case identification, isolation, quarantine, movement restriction, healthcare services, emergency care, and mutual aid.</td>
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<tr>
<td>As part of the district's crisis management plan, address pandemic influenza preparedness, involving all relevant stakeholders in the district (e.g., lead emergency response agency, district administrators, local public health representatives, school health and mental health professionals, teachers, food services director, and parent representatives). This committee is accountable for articulating strategic priorities and overseeing the development of the district's operational pandemic plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with local and/or state health departments and other community partners to establish organizational structures, such as the Incident Command System, to manage the execution of the district's pandemic flu plan. An Incident Command System, or ICS, is a standardized organization structure that establishes a line of authority and common terminology and procedures to be followed in response to an incident. Ensure compatibility between the district's established ICS and the local/state health department's and state education department's ICS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delineate accountability and responsibility as well as resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and executing specific components of the operational plan. Assure that the plan includes timelines, deliverables, and performance measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with your local and/or state health department and state education agencies to coordinate with their pandemic plans. Assure that pandemic planning is coordinated with the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community's pandemic plan as well as the state department of education's plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test the linkages between the district's Incident Command System and the local/state health department's and state education department's Incident Command System.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribute to the local health department's operational plan for surge capacity of healthcare and other services to meet the needs of the community (e.g., schools designated as contingency hospitals, schools feeding vulnerable populations, community utilizing the school district's healthcare and mental health staff). In an affected community, at least two pandemic disease waves (about 6-8 weeks each) are likely over several months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate into the pandemic influenza plan the requirements of students with special needs (e.g., low income students who rely on the school food service for daily meals), those in special facilities (e.g., juvenile justice facilities) as well as those who do not speak English as their first language.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participate in exercises of the community's pandemic plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with the local health department to address provision of psychosocial support services for the staff, students and their families during and after a pandemic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consider developing in concert with the local health department a surveillance system that would alert the local health department to a substantial increase in absenteeism among students.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement an exercise/drill to test your pandemic plan and revise it periodically.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share what you have learned from developing your preparedness and response plan with other school districts as well as private schools within the community to improve community response efforts.</td>
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</table>
## 2. Continuity of student learning and core operations:

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<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop scenarios describing the potential impact of a pandemic on student learning (e.g., student and staff absences), school closings, and extracurricular activities based on having various levels of illness among students and staff.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop alternative procedures to assure continuity of instruction (e.g., web-based distance instruction, telephone trees, mailed lessons and assignments, instruction via local radio or television stations) in the event of district school closures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a continuity of operations plan for essential central office functions including payroll and ongoing communication with students and parents.</td>
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## 3. Infection control policies and procedures:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work with the local health department to implement effective infection prevention policies and procedures that help limit the spread of influenza at schools in the district (e.g., promotion of hand hygiene, cough/sneeze etiquette). Make good hygiene a habit now in order to help protect children from many infectious diseases such as flu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide sufficient and accessible infection prevention supplies (e.g., soap, alcohol-based/waterless hand hygiene products, tissues and receptacles for their disposal).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish policies and procedures for students and staff sick leave absences unique to a pandemic influenza (e.g., non-punitive, liberal leave).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish sick leave policies for staff and students suspected to be ill or who become ill at school. Staff and students with known or suspected pandemic influenza should not remain at school and should return only after their symptoms resolve and they are physically ready to return to school.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish policies for transporting ill students.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assure that the local school district’s pandemic plan for school-based health facilities conforms to</td>
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those recommended for health care settings (Refer to www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup4.html).

4. Communications planning:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess readiness to meet communication needs in preparation for an influenza pandemic, including regular review, testing, and updating of communication plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a dissemination plan for communication with staff, students, and families, including lead spokespersons and links to other communication networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure language, culture and reading level appropriateness in communications by including community leaders representing different language and/or ethnic groups on the planning committee, asking for their participation both in document planning and the dissemination of public health messages within their communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and test platforms (e.g., hotlines, telephone trees, dedicated websites, and local radio or TV stations) for communicating pandemic status and actions to school district staff, students, and families.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and maintain up-to-date communications contacts of key public health and education stakeholders and use the network to provide regular updates as the influenza pandemic unfolds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assure the provision of redundant communication systems/channels that allow for the expedited transmission and receipt of information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advise district staff, students and families where to find up-to-date and reliable pandemic information from federal, state and local public health sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disseminate information about the local school district’s pandemic influenza preparedness and response plan (e.g., continuity of instruction, community containment measures).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disseminate information from public health sources covering routine infection control (e.g.,</td>
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<tr>
<td>hand hygiene, cough/sneeze etiquette), pandemic influenza fundamentals (e.g., signs and symptoms of influenza, modes of transmission) as well as personal and family protection and response strategies (e.g., guidance for the at-home care of ill students and family members).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anticipate the potential fear and anxiety of staff, students, and families as a result of rumors and misinformation and plan communications accordingly.</td>
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Colleges and Universities Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

1. Planning and coordination:

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<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify a pandemic coordinator and response team (including campus health services and mental health staff, student housing personnel, security, communications staff, physical plant staff, food services director, academic staff and student representatives) with defined roles and responsibilities for preparedness, response, and recovery planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delineate accountability and responsibility as well as resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and executing specific components of the operational plan. Assure that the plan includes timelines, deliverables, and performance measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporate into the pandemic plan scenarios that address college/university functioning based upon having various levels of illness in students and employees and different types of community containment interventions. Plan for different outbreak scenarios including variations in severity of illness, mode of transmission, and rates of infection in the community. Issues to consider include:</td>
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<td>▪ cancellation of classes, sporting events and/or other public events;</td>
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<td>▪ closure of campus, student housing, and/or public transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ assessment of the suitability of student housing for quarantine of exposed and/or ill students (See <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup8.html">www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup8.html</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ contingency plans for students who depend on student housing and food services (e.g., international students or students who live too far away to travel home)</td>
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<td>▪ contingency plans for maintaining research laboratories, particularly those using animals</td>
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<td>▪ stockpiling non-perishable food and equipment that may be needed in the case of an influenza pandemic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with state and local public health and other local authorities to identify legal authority, decision makers, trigger points, and thresholds to institute community containment measures such as closing (and re-opening) the college/university. Identify and review the college/university's legal responsibilities and authorities for executing infection control measures, including case identification, reporting information about ill students and employees, isolation, movement restriction, and provision of healthcare on campus.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure that pandemic influenza planning is consistent with any existing college/university emergency operations plan, and is coordinated with the pandemic plan of the community and of the state higher education agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with the local health department to discuss an operational plan for surge capacity for healthcare and other mental health and social services to meet the needs of the college/university and community during and after a pandemic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish an emergency communication plan and revise regularly. This plan should identify key contacts with local and state public health officials as well as the state's higher education officials (including back-ups) and the chain of communications, including alternate mechanisms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test the linkages between the college/university's Incident Command System and the Incident Command Systems of the local and/or state health department and the state's higher education agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement an exercise/drill to test your plan, and revise it regularly.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participate in exercises of the community's pandemic plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a recovery plan to deal with consequences of the pandemic (e.g., loss of students, loss of staff, financial and operational disruption).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share what you have learned from developing your preparedness and response plan with other colleges/universities to improve community response efforts.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Continuity of student learning and operations:

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<tr>
<td>Develop and disseminate alternative procedures to assure continuity of instruction (e.g., web-based distance instruction, telephone trees, mailed lessons and assignments, instruction via local radio or television stations) in the event of college/university closures.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a continuity of operations plan for maintaining the essential operations of the college/university including payroll; ongoing communication with employees, students and families; security; maintenance; as well as housekeeping and food service for student housing.</td>
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3. Infection control policies and procedures:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implement infection control policies and procedures that help limit the spread of influenza on campus (e.g. promotion of hand hygiene, cough/sneeze etiquette). (See Infection Control <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/healthprofessional.htm">www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/healthprofessional.htm</a>). Make good hygiene a habit now in order to help protect employees and students from many infectious diseases such as influenza. Encourage students and staff to get annual influenza vaccine (<a href="http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm">www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm</a>).</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procure, store and provide sufficient and accessible infection prevention supplies (e.g., soap, alcohol-based hand hygiene products, tissues and receptacles for their disposal).</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish policies for employee and student sick leave absences unique to pandemic influenza (e.g., non-punitive, liberal leave).</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish sick leave policies for employees and students suspected to be ill or who become ill on campus. Employees and students with known or suspected pandemic influenza should not remain on campus and should return only after their symptoms resolve and they are physically ready to return to campus.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a pandemic plan for campus-based healthcare facilities that addresses issues unique to healthcare settings (<a href="http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/healthprofessional.htm">See www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/healthprofessional.htm</a>).</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Communications planning:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess readiness to meet communications needs in preparation for an influenza pandemic, including regular review, testing, and updating of communications plans that link with public health authorities and other key stakeholders (See <a href="http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup10.html">www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/sup10.html</a>).</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a dissemination plan for communication with employees, students, and families, including lead spokespersons and links to other communication networks. Ensure language, culture and reading level appropriateness in communications.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and test platforms (e.g., hotlines, telephone trees, dedicated websites, local radio or television) for communicating college/university response and actions to employees, students, and families.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assure the provision of redundant communication systems/channels that allow for the expedited transmission and receipt of information.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise employees and students where to find up-to-date and reliable pandemic information from federal, state and local public health sources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminate information about the college/university's pandemic preparedness and response plan. This should include the potential impact of a pandemic on student housing closure, and the contingency plans for students who depend on student housing and campus food service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
including how student safety will be maintained for those who remain in student housing.

| Disseminate information from public health sources covering routine infection control (e.g., hand hygiene, coughing/sneezing etiquette), pandemic influenza fundamentals (e.g., signs and symptoms of influenza, modes of transmission), personal and family protection and response strategies (including the HHS Pandemic Influenza Planning Guide for Individuals and Families at [www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab3.html](http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab3.html)), and the at-home care of ill students or employees and their family members. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

| Anticipate and plan communications to address the potential fear and anxiety of employees, students and families that may result from rumors or misinformation. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Appendix N: Business Preparedness*

In the event of pandemic influenza, businesses will play a key role in protecting employees' health and safety as well as limiting the negative impact to the economy and society. Planning for pandemic influenza is critical. Companies that provide critical infrastructure services, such as power and telecommunications, also have a special responsibility to plan for continued operation in a crisis and should plan accordingly. As with any catastrophe, having a contingency plan is essential.

The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have developed guidelines, including a checklist, to assist businesses in planning for a pandemic outbreak as well as for other comparable catastrophes. In addition the U.S. Department of Labor (OSHA) has developed a Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for an Influenza Pandemic which can be found at [www.osha.gov/Publications/influenza_pandemic.html](http://www.osha.gov/Publications/influenza_pandemic.html). This document discusses the possible role of mask use by employees and employers responsibilities.

1. Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your business:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify a pandemic coordinator and/or team with defined roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response planning. The planning process should include input from labor representatives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify essential employees and other critical inputs (e.g. raw materials, suppliers, sub-contractor services/products, and logistics) required to maintain business operations by location and function during a pandemic.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train and prepare ancillary workforce (e.g. contractors, employees in other job titles/descriptions, retirees).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and plan for scenarios likely to result in an increase or decrease in demand for your products and/or services during a pandemic (e.g. effect of restriction on mass gatherings, need for hygiene supplies).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine potential impact of a pandemic on company business financials using multiple possible scenarios that affect different product</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lines and/or production sites.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine potential impact of a pandemic on business-related domestic and international travel (e.g. quarantines, border closures).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Find up-to-date, reliable pandemic information from community public health, emergency management, and other sources and make sustainable links.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish an emergency communications plan and revise periodically. This plan includes identification of key contacts (with back-ups), chain of communications (including suppliers and customers), and processes for tracking and communicating business and employee status.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement an exercise/drill to test your plan, and revise periodically.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your employees and customers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forecast and allow for employee absences during a pandemic due to factors such as personal illness, family member illness, community containment measures and quarantines, school and/or business closures, and public transportation closures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement guidelines to modify the frequency and type of face-to-face contact (e.g. hand-shaking, seating in meetings, office layout, shared workstations) among employees and between employees and customers (refer to CDC recommendations).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage and track annual influenza vaccination for employees.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate employee access to and availability of healthcare services during a pandemic, and improve services as needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate employee access to and availability of mental health and social services during a pandemic, including corporate, community, and faith-based resources, and improve services as needed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify employees and key customers with special needs, and incorporate the requirements of such persons into your preparedness plan.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Establish policies to be implemented during a pandemic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establish policies for employee compensation and sick-leave absences unique to a pandemic (e.g. non-punitive, liberal leave), including policies on when a previously ill person is no longer infectious and can return to work after illness.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish policies for flexible worksite (e.g. telecommuting) and flexible work hours (e.g. staggered shifts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish policies for preventing influenza spread at the worksite (e.g. promoting respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette, and prompt exclusion of people with influenza symptoms).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish policies for employees who have been exposed to pandemic influenza, are suspected to be ill, or become ill at the worksite (e.g. infection control response, immediate mandatory sick leave).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish policies for restricting travel to affected geographic areas (consider both domestic and international sites), evacuating employees working in or near an affected area when an outbreak begins, and guidance for employees returning from affected areas (refer to CDC travel recommendations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set up authorities, triggers, and procedures for activating and terminating the company's response plan, altering business operations (e.g. shutting down operations in affected areas), and transferring business knowledge to key employees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Allocate resources to protect your employees and customers during a pandemic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide sufficient and accessible infection control supplies (e.g. hand-hygiene products, tissues and receptacles for their disposal) in all business locations.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance communications and information technology infrastructures as needed to support employee telecommuting and remote customer access.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure availability of medical consultation and advice for emergency response.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Allocate resources to protect your employees and customers during a pandemic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop and disseminate programs and materials</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
covering pandemic fundamentals (e.g. signs and symptoms of influenza, modes of transmission), personal and family protection and response strategies (e.g. hand hygiene, coughing/sneezing etiquette, contingency plans).

- Anticipate employee fear and anxiety, rumors and misinformation and plan communications accordingly.
- Ensure that communications are culturally and linguistically appropriate.
- Disseminate information to employees about your pandemic preparedness and response plan.
- Provide information for the at-home care of ill employees and family members.
- Develop platforms (e.g. hotlines, dedicated websites) for communicating pandemic status and actions to employees, vendors, suppliers, and customers inside and outside the worksite in a consistent and timely way, including redundancies in the emergency contact system.
- Identify community sources for timely and accurate pandemic information (domestic and international) and resources for obtaining countermeasures (e.g. vaccines and antivirals).

6. Coordinate with external organizations and help your community:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Not Started</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate with insurers, health plans, and major local healthcare facilities to share your pandemic plans and understand their capabilities and plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate with federal, state, and local public health agencies and/or emergency responders to participate in their planning processes, share your pandemic plans, and understand their capabilities and plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with local and/or state public health agencies and/or emergency responders about the assets and/or services your business could contribute to the community.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share best practices with other businesses in your communities, chambers of commerce, and associations to improve community response efforts.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix O: Management of Pandemic Influenza Fatalities

The Wyoming Department of Health recognizes that the timely, safe, and respectful disposition of pandemic influenza fatalities is an important component of an effective public health response. Based upon the epidemiology and transmission of pandemic influenza, an outbreak may quickly climb to disastrous levels that result in mass fatalities. Mass fatalities will not only place extraordinary demands on state and local jurisdictions, but they will also place a burden on the religious community, cultural community and the families of the victims.

If local and state fatality management capacities are exceeded support resources from the federal government (coordinated through the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense) may be available upon request. These services could potentially include establishing temporary morgue facilities and the processing, preparation and disposition of human remains. The state and federal government’s level of involvement will be strained during a pandemic. Therefore, it is important for healthcare facilities, coroners, morgues, and funeral homes to plan for mass fatality management during an influenza pandemic.

**Strategies to Manage Mass Fatalities:**

1. Review current disaster plans for managing remains and handling morgue overflow;
2. Develop plans to manage contaminated remains for an extended period of time (e.g. days);
3. Assess current capacity for refrigeration of deceased persons;
4. Work with local health officials and morticians to identify temporary morgue sites;
5. Determine the scope and volume of postmortem materials needed and consider a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for surge mortuary supplies (e.g. body bag, refrigerator trucks, etc.).

**Handling of Deceased Bodies by the General Public, Such as At-home-death:**

If the unfortunate circumstance should arise where the death of a family member occurs in your home, you should isolate the body in an area where it will not be touched or disturbed. If the body must be moved or otherwise touched you should wear gloves and avoid contacting oral and respiratory secretions (from mouth, eyes, nose). Wash hands thoroughly after touching the body or surfaces contaminated by secretions. Thoroughly disinfect surfaces and launder clothing that may have been contaminated by secretions. Call the appropriate authorities to report the death.
Handling of Deceased Bodies in Healthcare Facilities

Removal of the body from the isolation room/area

- Personal protective equipment (PPE) to be used by healthcare workers/employees:
  - Particulate respirator (N95 or higher) if healthcare workers/employees remove the body from the isolation room/area immediately after the patient’s death;
  - Surgical or procedure mask is sufficient if air in the isolation room/area has been exchanged;
  - Follow Standard Precautions to protect from blood/body fluids/secretions.
- The body should be fully sealed in an impermeable body bag prior to removal from the isolation room/area and prior to transfer to pathology or to the mortuary.
- No leaking of body fluids should occur and the outside bag should be kept clean.
- Transfer to pathology or to mortuary should occur as soon as possible after death.
- After removing PPE perform hand hygiene.
- If the family of the patient wishes to view the body after removal from the isolation room/area, they may be allowed to do so. If the patient died in the infectious period, the family should wear gloves and gowns and perform hand hygiene.

Autopsy and Morgue Safety Recommendations

In general, autopsy safety procedures for pandemic influenza-infected human bodies should be consistent with those used for any autopsy procedure with potentially infected remains, with a few specific precautions. During an influenza pandemic it may be prudent to handle all deceased victims as if they had an infectious disease. For an influenza infected body the respiratory tract, lungs, and respiratory secretions may still contain the influenza virus, and additional respiratory protection is needed during procedures that may generate small-particle aerosols or splashes with fluids or secretions (e.g., use of power saws and washing intestines). Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and a protective autopsy setting are essential to reducing the risk of disease transmission.

Recommended Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for autopsy/postmortem exams

- The number of people present should be restricted to the minimum number necessary.
- Particulate respirators (N95 or higher).
- Face shield (preferably) or goggles.
- Other protective equipment to protect from blood/body fluids/secretions as for any autopsy on potentially infected remains (Standard Precautions).
Recommended Environmental controls

- Air-borne infection controls in autopsy room, such as 12 air changes per hour, negative pressure relative to adjacent areas, and direct exhaust of air to the outside. Exhaust systems around the autopsy table should direct air (and aerosols) away from the individuals performing the procedure (e.g. exhaust downward).

- Use containment devices whenever possible. Use biosafety cabinets for the handling and examination of smaller specimens. When available, use vacuum shrouds for oscillating saws or local exhaust ventilation to contain aerosols and reduce the volume released into the ambient air environment.

- Reduce aerosols in the autopsy room (e.g. during lung excision) by:
  - avoiding the use of power saws;
  - conducting procedures under water if there is a chance of aerosolization; and
  - avoiding splashes when removing lung tissue.

Mortuary Care

- Mortuary staff should be informed that the deceased had pandemic influenza.

- If mortuary staff are responding to the death of a pandemic influenza-infected patient who died at home, PPE should be used while in the home as per standard precautions. If other members of the household are ill with influenza mortuary staff should wear respiratory protection such as surgical masks or N95 respirators.

- In the mortuary, mortuary staff and the burial team should use standard precautions when caring for the body. This includes appropriate use of PPE and performance of hand hygiene to avoid unprotected contact with blood, body fluids, secretions, or excretions.  

- Embalming may be conducted as per routine.

- Hygienic preparation of the deceased (e.g. cleaning of body, tidying of hair, trimming of nails, and shaving) may also be conducted.

- The body in the body bag can be safely removed for storage in the mortuary, sent to the crematorium, or placed in a coffin for burial.

- If an autopsy is being considered, the body may be held under refrigeration in the mortuary. Standard infection control precautions should be followed.

- If the family of the patient wishes to touch the body, they may be allowed to do so. If the patient died in the infectious period, the family should wear gloves and gowns and follow with hand hygiene. If family members want to kiss or touch the body (hands, face), these body parts should be disinfected, using a common antiseptic (e.g. 70% alcohol).
• If the family requests only to view the body or the face of the deceased, but not touch it, there is no need to wear any kind of PPE.

References
Appendix G: Federal Strategic National Antiviral Stockpile
Prepared August 25, 2006
"SNS STOCKPILE"

Assumptions:
1. Distribution will be apportioned to each County based on Wyoming 2005 Estimated County population numbers.

2. Our antiviral allotment will be composed of 86% Tamiflu and 9% Relenza.

3. We assume this quantity of antivirals will be sent to WYOMING at the time a pandemic flu outbreak is imminent.

4. We need to prepare for sizes and weight of shipments to the local county offices based on limitations of transportation options, building access, and labor to move the allotment to holding and dispensing locations.

5. Our plan needs to be very flexible, based on unknown circumstances which may occur.

6. In addition to this quantity from the SNS Stockpile, the State will also receive 3,718 additional courses our State Purchase.

7. The 74,826 courses from this SNS Stockpile and the 3,718 courses from the State Purchase will provide antivirals for about one-fourth of our population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of people to be treated by this order</th>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>74,826</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86% Tamiflu</td>
<td>55960.3</td>
<td>80% Tamiflu 99660.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9% Relenza</td>
<td>14965.2</td>
<td>9% Relenza 14965.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAMIFLU PALLET DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>40X45X36</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>325</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELENZA PALLET DIMENSIONS</td>
<td>40X45X36</td>
<td>WEIGHT</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of People treated per Pallet</th>
<th>4560</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(60 cases of 16 Courses)</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30 cases of 4 cases high)</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DISTRIBUTION AMOUNT FOR COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005 Estimated Population</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight Lbs.</th>
<th>RELENZA Courses</th>
<th>RELENZA Pallets</th>
<th>RELENZA Weight Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTA</td>
<td>19,359</td>
<td>2234</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>173.6</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINCOLN</td>
<td>19,999</td>
<td>1592</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TETON</td>
<td>18,032</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBLETTE</td>
<td>6,926</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEETWATER</td>
<td>37,975</td>
<td>4453</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>331.0</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARSON</td>
<td>10,331</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10540.49</td>
<td>3,091432</td>
<td>1004.716</td>
<td>355831198</td>
<td>3,52616398</td>
<td>10220.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FREMONT                    | 38,491          | 4299            | 0.96                | 316.3           | 1072            | 1.12                | 323.9               |
| WASHAKIE                   | 7,939           | 952             | 0.21                | 69.2            | 233             | 0.24                | 70.4                |
| HOT SPRINGS                | 4,537           | 533             | 0.12                | 39.6            | 133             | 0.14                | 40.3                |
| PARK                       | 28,866          | 3134            | 0.72                | 232.8           | 784             | 0.82                | 236.7               |
| BIG HORN                   | 11,333          | 1352            | 0.30                | 56.8            | 333             | 0.33                | 50.0                |
|                            | 10220.77        | 2,332824        | 768.083            | 25551918        | 2,66102814      | 771.96098           |

DISTRIBUTION AMOUNT FOR COUNTRIES (Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005 Estimated Population</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight Lbs.</th>
<th>RELENZA Courses</th>
<th>RELENZA Pallets</th>
<th>RELENZA Weight Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHERIDAN</td>
<td>27,309</td>
<td>3219</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>238.9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHNSON</td>
<td>7,721</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATRONA</td>
<td>66,799</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>2081</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPBELL</td>
<td>37,408</td>
<td>4396</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>335</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTON</td>
<td>5,671</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>CROOK</td>
<td>6,162</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVERSE</td>
<td>12,766</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0.39</td>
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<td>19736.31</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1464.601</td>
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<td>1430.654</td>
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<tr>
<td>LARAMIE</td>
<td>65,163</td>
<td>10610</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>742.7</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>274.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBANY</td>
<td>30,892</td>
<td>3631</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>269.4</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSHEN</td>
<td>12,343</td>
<td>1438</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>78.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLATTE</td>
<td>8,819</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOBRARA</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>269</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>20.3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16321.24</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4950.5109</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1214.918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1203.448</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>506294</td>
<td>59860.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>4441.73</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>.4488.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weights identified for Tamiflu and Relenza as individual county amounts as well as the total are based on the added weight of pallets. Therefore in many cases the actual weight may not be as much as shown.

Formula used: Number of courses for Wyoming divided by Population of Wyoming times population of county.
Appendix R: Wyoming State Antiviral Stockpile
Prepared: Oct 2, 2006; Updated April 9, 2007
"STATE PURCHASE"

Assumptions:
1. Distribution will be apportioned to each County based on Wyoming 2005 Estimated County population numbers.
2. Our antiviral allotment will be composed of 16% Tamiflu and 84% Relenza.
3. WDH will reserve 5% of these antivirals (Suggested 0%)
4. We need to prepare for size and weight of shipments to the local county offices based on limitations of transportation options, building access, and labor to move the allotment to holding and dispensing locations.
5. Our plan needs to be very flexible, especially on unknown circumstances which may occur.
6. In addition to the quantity from this State purchase, the State will also receive 74,626 additional courses from CDC/SNS Stockpiles.
7. The 92,718 courses from this order and the 74,626 courses from SNS Stockpile will provide antivirals for about one-fourth of our population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight-Lbs.</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Courses</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Pallets</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Weight-Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laramie</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>165.5</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>116.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cheyenne</td>
<td>1473</td>
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<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>Hot Springs</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platte</td>
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<td>277.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight-Lbs.</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Courses</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Pallets</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Weight-Lbs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>286.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Carbon</td>
<td>2592</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>194.8</td>
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<td>Big Horn</td>
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<td>0.25</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight-Lbs.</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Courses</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Pallets</th>
<th>RFL ENFA Weight-Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheyenne</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>85.13</td>
<td>1.3533</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>534.5017</td>
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Supply for Dispensing
To be stored in State Facilities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>State Reserved Quantity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92,718</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2635.9</td>
<td>50082.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>For Storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>For Storage</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Distributed to Counties (Stackable 4 cases high):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight Lbs.</th>
<th>RELENZA Courses</th>
<th>RELENZA Pallets</th>
<th>RELENZA Weight Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHERIDAN</td>
<td>27,369</td>
<td>2593</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>180.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOHNSON</td>
<td>7,721</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>56.3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAGRONA</td>
<td>69,789</td>
<td>5564</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>535.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPBELL</td>
<td>37,435</td>
<td>3679</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>272.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTON</td>
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<td>45.7</td>
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<td>CINDY</td>
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<td>628</td>
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<td>46.1</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVERSE</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>10658.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOSKIN</td>
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<td>1200</td>
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<td>FILL</td>
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<td>NOBRARA</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE RESERVE</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Courses</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Pallets</th>
<th>TAMIFLU Weight Lbs.</th>
<th>RELENZA Courses</th>
<th>RELENZA Pallets</th>
<th>RELENZA Weight Lbs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>155.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weights identified for Tamiflu as individual county amounts as well as the total are based on the added weight of pallets. Therefore in many cases the actual weight may not be as much as shown.

Formula used: Number of courses for Wyoming divided by Population of Wyoming times population of county.
Appendix R: Pandemic Severity Index

Implementation of the community mitigation strategies discussed in this plan may be based on the severity of the pandemic. A general guideline which WDH may use to guide the implementation of such measures is the CDC Pandemic Severity Index (PSI).

(reference: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States. CDC.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions* by Setting</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2 and 3</th>
<th>4 and 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary isolation of ill at home (adults and children), combine with use of antiviral treatment as available and indicated</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary quarantine of household members in homes with ill persons (adults and children), consider combining with antiviral prophylaxis if effective, feasible, and quarantines sufficient</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child social distancing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- dismiss of students from schools and school-based activities, and closure of child care programs</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>54 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reduce out of school social contacts and community mixing</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>54 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Workplace / Community</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult social distancing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- decrease number of social contacts (e.g., encourage teleconferences, alternatives to face-to-face meetings)</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- increase distance between persons (e.g., reduce density in public transit, workplace)</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- modify, postpone, or cancel selected public gatherings to promote social distance (e.g., stadium events, theater performances)</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- modify workplace schedules and practices (e.g., telework, staggered shifts)</td>
<td>Generally not recommended</td>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>Recommend</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>